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THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLICLY
OWNED URBAN MASS TRANSIT: A




Urban mass transit is an appropriate focus for a model urban transit
act for two reasons. The first reason is the enormous commitment of
public funds to the subsidy of mass transit. In the 1970s transit was
one of the most rapidly growing federal aid programs.' From 1970 to
1980 the federal subsidy to transit increased thirty-six fold. From 1980
to 1986 federal spending for transit continued at a level of three to four
billion dollars per year.2
Because the Reagan Administration advocates the reduction of fed-
eral capital and operating subsidies, continuing but reduced federal
* Trustees Professor of Regulatory Policy, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A.
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1. See A. ALTSHULER, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: POLITICS AND
POLICY INNOVATION 34 (1979); Pucher, Distribution of Federal Transportation Subsi-
dies, 19 URB. AFF. Q. 191, 212 (1983). Although the respective proportionate use of
transit and automobiles in passenger miles shifted from 35% and 65% in 1945 to 3%
and 97% in 1975, public expenditure for public transportation remains high. M. Pikar-
ski & C. Johnson, After the Dust Settles: Transit in Transition 9 (Sept. 1981) (unpub-
lished manuscript). "Part of this disproportionate expenditure is a result of major
efforts made in the last decade to recapture lost market share through increases in ser-
vice, aggressive marketing, and operating subsidies designed to lower transit fares." Id.
2. Phelps, Fate of Mass Transit Support Could be Decided by Congress, Minneapolis
Tribune, Feb. 10, 1986, at 7M.
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subsidies for this industry seem likely. 3 Although state and local gov-
ernments remain committed to significant transit subsidies, fiscal pres-
sures limit the subsidies that these levels of government can provide.4
At the same time, average transit operating costs have increased at ap-
proximately double the rate of inflation since federal transit subsidies
started,5 and growth in transit ridership is disappointing.6 Reduced
government subsidies and increased operating costs, combined with
changing conditions in the transportation marketplace, create financial
pressures that force communities to question the traditional approach
of a heavily subsidized publicly owned mass transit monopoly that
plans and produces transit services.7
The second reason that mass transit is appropriate for a model urban
transit act is that mass transit in the United States shifted from primar-
ily private ownership to almost total public ownership in less than 20
years during the 1960s and 1970s. As later discussion demonstrates,
however, a widely accepted model of organizational law has not been
developed for these systems.8
3. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1982:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 527 (1981) (statement of Arthur Teele, Administrator, Urban Mass Transit Ad-
ministration); Wiese, Reaganomics: Spelling Trouble for Transit, MASS TRANSIT 6, 7
(Oct. 1981); Hemily & Meyer, The Future of Urban Public Transportation: The
Problems and Opportunities of a Changing Rule, 12 TRANSp. L.J. 287, 294-95 (1982).
The resulting financial pressures on transit systems should provide an incentive for local
officials and transit management to achieve cost-saving measures. Id. at 298. Accord-
ing to Pikarski, "[w]hat appears to be a crisis ... is, in reality, both the death rattle of
outdated institutions for delivering transportation service and the painful birth of many
new delivery systems." M. Pikarski & C. Johnson, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Kemp & Kirby, Government Policies Affecting Competition in Public Transporta-
tion, in URBAN TRANSIT 277 (C. Lave ed. 1985).
5. The design of the federal transit subsidy program has reduced incentives for per-
formance at lowest cost and has contributed to cost increases. See Pucher, Markstedt &
Hirschman, Impact of Subsidies on the Costs of Urban Public Transportation, 17 J.
TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 155, 157, 169 (1983).
6. Orski, Redesigning Local Transportation Service, in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note
4, at 255, 257-58.
7. Id. at 255-56; Kemp & Kirby, supra note 4, at 293-94.
8. Among the 117 largest U.S. cities (1970 census), only 10 had publicly owned
transit systems in 1949. By 1959, three more systems had become publicly owned.
From the late 1950s through the 1970s, however, transit farebox revenues failed to keep
pace with costs. The continuation of transit service required large public subsidies, and
political pressures developed to make the transit systems public. By 1969, 31 more
systems were converted to the public sector, and by 1979, an additional 62 systems were
converted. Thus, as of 1979, private carriers had survived as the major carrier in only
11 of the 117 largest cities in the United States. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, Gov-
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This article focuses on the problem of organizational law for the
planning, financing, and production of mass transit services through
private firms and government enterprise,9 and develops a model act for
the industry. In any government enterprise, organizational law and
goal achievement are importantly and inextricably related to one
another. 1
A great diversity of organizational law exists in government enter-
prises, even within a single industry such as urban mass transit.
Although diversity of organizational law within private enterprise ex-
ists, the term "private enterprise" suggests at least some basic points of
comparison. For example, the private share offering company model is
ERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: A CASE STUDY OF URBAN MASS TRANSIT 4
(1981).
9. The term "government enterprise" includes all production processes of goods or
services that are effectively under the control of a government entity or a branch of the
government established to conduct the undertaking.
10. Schmalensee suggests that the choice of institutional structural design influences
the costs and benefits of various managerial and regulatory discretionary activity. R.
SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 7-8, 146 (1979). The rela-
tionship between structural design and behavior, however, is little understood, and no
single view or approach has emerged to lend a framework that would help to predict the
behavioral implications of alternative arrangements of control. Id. at 61-62. Part of
this developmental difficulty is that current literature focuses on criticism of the con-
duct of regulators and regulated firms, id. at 7, and negative information of this sort is
not of great use in institutional design. Id. at 149.
Because a key factor in determining performance under public ownership seems to be
the control exercised over enterprise managers and the management's accountability,
more knowledge about the relation between administrative structure and management
behavior would be useful. Id. at 97, 146. At present, we cannot describe structural
conditions which will ensure that specific and narrowly defined tasks will be performed
well and that administrative discretion is exercised acceptably. Id. at 149. Thus, we
know a good deal less than we should, and a large number of areas would benefit from
further economic research. Id. at 149-50.
For further discussions of the interrelationship of organizational structure and goal
achievement, see H. LIEBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY THEORY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 157, 178-80 (1978); UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION, SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN THE INDUSTRIAL FIELDS 17 (1954) [hereinafter UNTAA]; A.
WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICES OF GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS 10, 202 (1978); Roberts, An Evolutionary and Institutional View of the
Behavior of Public and Private Companies, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 415-16 (1975);
SeIdman, The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls, 14 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 183, 185 (1954); B. Baysinger & H. Butler, Performance Effects of Evolutionary
Changes in Board Composition (June 1984) (unpublished manuscript); But see R.
POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD xxiii (1976)
(in the context of the Third World countries, legal choices have relatively little impact
on performance).
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almost universal for large scale private enterprise. Moreover, in re-
sponse to experience, education, and competitive market pressures,
similar private firms have developed fairly similar divisions of policy
formation and operational management functions."
No similar uniformity among government enterprises exists, even in
the same industry. In Canada and the United States, at least three
general types or models of government enterprise are in common use:
the company form, the government department form, and the public
corporation form.'" In the transit industry, surveys reveal great differ-
ences from system to system with regard to policy formation and the
policy-making and operations function distinctions.' 3 Government in-
volvement itself creates considerable differences among government en-
terprises, depending on whether the focus of power is federal, state,
local, or diffused among several governments."4
The task of designing an optimal organizational statute for urban
mass transit is complicated because government enterprises have re-
ceived surprisingly little academic attention in the United States. The
explanation for this lack of study may be that the increase in the use of
government entities in the United States has been gradual, not dra-
matic, and because government production of goods and services is an
embarrassment to many Western economists. 5 In the absence of sig-
nificant research, little positive economic theory exists concerning gov-
ernment enterprise. 1
6
Given both the limited positive economic theory and the great diver-
sity of organizational law among government enterprise, caution is in
order. At this stage, intuition and inductive reasoning play major roles
in the analysis of these governance issues. The Model Act is therefore
drafted to leave substantial leeway for experimentation in implementa-
11. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANAL-
YsIs (1976); W. OUCHI, THE M-FORM SOCIETY 18-25 (1984).
12. For a definition of these terms, see infra notes 19-21. See also N. HAMILTON &
P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 11-16; UNTAA, supra note 9, at 5.
13. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 16-27.
14. Id. at 32-36.
15. Pashigan, Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facil-
ities, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1239, 1240 (1976).
16. Rossant, Foreword to A. WALSH, supra note 10, at xi; S. BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM 183 (1982) (government ownership in the United States has not been
studied to the point where firm conclusions are possible); R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note
10, at 149-50; Baumol, Toward a Theory of Public Enterprise, ATLANTIC ECON. J. 13,
19 (1984).
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tion. The Act is offered to prompt constructive debate toward the for-
mulation of an optimal model of governance for the provision and
production of mass transit services.
The body of this article is divided into two sections. Section II
draws upon theoretical literature to develop a general public corpora-
tion model for the governance of urban mass transit service. Section
III presents the Model Act with comments following each of the Act's
major sections requiring further explication.
While the traditional approach to mass transit service has been ex-
clusive public provision and monopoly production with significant
losses to economic efficiency, the Model Act incorporates two major
innovations. First, the Act recommends the separation of the planning
and financing of transit services-the decision to provide transit serv-
ices-from the actual production of the transit services. Second, the
Act proposes contract bidding among competing producers to intro-
duce competitive pressures for lower cost production into the produc-
tion of transit. 7
II. A GENERAL MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL LAW FOR THE
PROVISION AND PRODUCTION OF URBAN
MASS TRANSIT SERVICES
Much of the confusion concerning the organizational law of govern-
ment enterprise originates in the lack of any coherent conception of the
basic purposes that the three types of government enterprise serve. 8
The purpose of organizational law for a transit system is to maximize
the welfare of all persons affected by a transit system; in other words,
17. See Orski, supra note 6, at 274-75. Many of the ideas proposed in the Act were
incorporated into the 1984 amendments to Minnesota's mass transit legislation for the
Minneapolis and St. Paul metropolitan area. See MINN. STAT. §§ 473.371-.499 (1984).
The writing and legislative testimony on privatization of government services of Ted
Kolderie, project director of the Public Services Redesign Project, Hubert H.
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, played a major role in the formulation of this
legislation. See Kolderie, Rethinking Public Service Delivery, 64 PUB. MGMT. 6-9 (Oct.
1982). The author also provided research and legislative testimony on this legislation.
The Minnesota legislation is the most far reaching legislation separating policymak-
ing and operating responsibilities. Oraki, supra note 6, at 274. A number of the con-
cepts in the Model Act also appear in the 1983 Illinois legislation that created the
Regional Transportation Authority for Chicago. See Illinois Regional Transportation
Authority Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 701.01-.05 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
18. In an effort to help fill this gap, the author devoted several chapters of an earlier
book to a broad examination of the purpose of government enterprise. For a full discus-
sion, see N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 47-92.
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the goal is economic efficiency. In the presence of mass transit market
failures such as the public goods aspect of transit 9 or the existence of
externalities20 like air pollution, the government may undertake meas-
ures to remedy the market failures and establish conditions for eco-
nomic efficiency.2
19. Public goods are usually defined as goods having the characteristics of nonap-
propriability and nonrivalry in consumption. Nonappropriability means that such
goods, once made available, are equally available to all individuals. Nonrivalry in con-
sumption indicates that for a given output, additional consumption by one person does
not imply reduced consumption by another. A classic public good is the lighthouse,
where one ship's receipt of the benefit of a warning signal in no way deprives others
from receiving the warning as well. J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT Fi-
NANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 22 (1977). Thus, public goods in the
present context are aspects of transit that an additional person can consume without a
concomitant decrease in the consumption of another. They arise due to the altruistic
nature of the public, many of whom do not use mass transit, but who wish to see distri-
butional equity. See Dajani & Gilbert, Measuring the Performance of Transit Systems, 4
TRANSP. PLAN. & TECH. 99 (1978). Although some economists do not define depar-
tures from distributional equity as market failure, the stronger argument is to see distri-
bution as a type of public good. The provision of transit to the transportation
disadvantaged will clearly satisfy the altruistic preferences of an additional member of
the public without any decrease in the consumption by other members of the public;
that is, both nonappropriability and nonrivalry exist. See Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket
Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 111 (1979).
20. Externalities occur when the consumption or production decisions of one agent
affect the consumption or production opportunities open to another agent directly
rather than through the prices that the first agent faces. If any direct effects exist, the
decision maker is neither fully charged for any costs his or her actions impose on other
people, nor rewarded for any benefits he or she may confer. The prices faced, therefore,
will not be efficient. See P. LAYARD & A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 23
(1978).
In transit, externalities arise from several sources. Positive consumption externalities
stem from a reduction in noise and air pollution and time and injury/life savings by
automobile drivers from congestion reduction. A. ALTSHULER, supra note 1, at 107-10,
175. Positive production externalities stem from a reduced need for new highways and
parking facilities, time saving by commercial and public vehicles (police, ambulance,
and fire), and abatement of the nation's energy problems. Id. at 107, 109-10, 169-71.
21. Allocative efficiency requires that each decision maker be confronted with the
social marginal cost of his or her actions. Basically, an individual pursues only those
actions in which the perceived benefits exceed the perceived costs. If each person exper-
iences a cost to himself for his actions, which is the same as the cost to society, then
only actions with net sound gains will be undertaken under normal decision-making.
Actions that result in a social cost greater than benefits are avoided, because the deci-
sion maker sees a personal cost greater than the personal benefit.
For consumers and producers, this condition is generally met when the price of a
good equals its private marginal cost, perfect markets assumed. See P. LAYARD & A.
WALTERS, supra note 20, at 14-15. Note that private marginal cost is the private pro-
ducer's addition to total cost attributable to the addition of one unit of output. Social
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/2
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In making these determinations, the governmental decision maker
should be confronted with the marginal social cost of its actions.22
Marginal social costs are a function of the individual preferences of
persons in the community.23 Voting with improved information flow
to the community is one mechanism through which a political decision
maker is confronted with the marginal social cost of its actions. 24 In
addition, those transit services for which the community expresses a
preference must be produced at the lowest cost to achieve economic
efficiency. 25
marginal cost is the resource cost to society of having an additional unit produced.
Market failures, like externalities and public goods, may lead to a divergence between
private marginal cost and social marginal cost. See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD,
MICROECONoMIc THEORY 474-76 (4th ed. 1975).
Government may take measures to correct these market failures. For example, as
Layard and Walters point out in the case of positive or negative externalities, "while
taxation or subsidy may be a suitable remedy in some cases, in others regulations will be
administratively simpler. In addition, when we consider psychic externalities, policies
relating to social institutions may be necessary." P. LAYARD & A. WALTERS, supra
note 20, at 25. Similarly, the government must intervene to pay for pure public goods if
they are to be provided: "To do this efficiently, [the government] has to make guesses
about indvidual preferences, just as it must if it wishes to regulate externality." Id. at
196. The inevitable imperfections of democratic political processes in expressing indi-
vidual choice, however, constrain the accuracy of the government's estimation of indi-
vidual preferences. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 468-78
(1976).
Policies addressing problems of market failure must take into account those distor-
tions in the economy that are inevitable. This is the problem with the second best
constraint principle, which states that if one of the standard efficiency conditions cannot
be satisfied, the other efficiency conditions are no longer desirable. P. LAYARD & A.
WALTERS, supra note 20, at 181. Second best constraints include the administrative
capacities of the government and the nature of politics and bureaucracy. Id. at 202.
The existence of second best constraints advises caution but not paralysis. Kahn
points out that even though things elsewhere in the economy are not organized opti-
mally, it is plausible to expect policy formed after careful analysis and with common
sense to yield improvements. A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 70 (1971).
Thus, it seems reasonable to require that government decision makers be confronted, to
the degree possible, with the marginal social costs of their decisions. This will promote
an accurate reflection of consumer preferences.
22. See supra note 21.
23. Id. The social choice literature discussing nonmarket mechanisms for revealing
individual preference in situations involving market failures is not well developed. See
N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 53; J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 21, at
468-78.
24. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 54-55.
25. In practice, welfare maximization in a market economy is achieved by creating
conditions for Pareto optimality, provided certain income distribution constraints are
met. See P. LAYARD & A. WALTERS, supra note 20, at 50. A Pareto optimal state is
1987]
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The task is to outline the principal features of the entity that will
define transit policy which reflects community preferences and execute
this policy at the lowest possible cost. The theoretical literature, pri-
marily of European origin, defines two principal approaches to the de-
sign of a legal structure for a government enterprise.
One approach is for government to directly undertake policy, objec-
tives, and operations in the form of a government department or a sub-
division of a government department.26 Under this legal structure,
direct responsibility on all matters devolves on the director of the de-
partment and ultimately on the chief executive of the government. Di-
rect government control of operations is exercised through executive
order and legislative review. Personnel are usually subject to civil ser-
vice regulation.27 Annual appropriations finance the enterprise, which
in turn subjects it to government accounting, budget, and audit con-
trols. The enterprise frequently possesses the sovereign immunity of
the state.28
A second more contemporary approach is to create a semi-autono-
mous legal entity with a separate board that shares responsibility for
policy-making with the creator government.2 9 The government can es-
tablish this semi-autonomous entity either in the legal form of a private
company or as a public corporation.a
In the private company form, the government registers the enter-
prise as a limited liability company under the corporation laws applica-
defined as a state in which no one can be made better off without making someone else
worse off, the change in the affected party's welfare determines whether the Pareto opti-
mal state is achieved. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 21, at 441.
When a Pareto optimal state is reached, all options to create better conditions for
someone without harming someone else have been expended. The achievement of a
Pareto optimal state is a relatively uncontroversial goal that involves net social gain
without any accompanying individual loss.
The first condition needed to establish Pareto optimality is allocative efficiency. See
supra note 20. The second condition required for Pareto optimality is the production of
goods at lowest cost or production efficiency. These concepts are discussed fully in N.
HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 50-55.
26. R. JAILE, MANAGEMENT OF STATE ENTERPRISES IN INDIA 71 (1967); UN-
TAA, supra note 10, at 5-9.
27. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 6.
28. W. Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative Analysis, in GOVERN-
MENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 308-09 (W. Friedmann & J. Garner eds.
1970); UNTAA, supra note 10, at 6.
29. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 9.
30. Id.
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MODEL URBAN MASS TRANSIT ACT
ble to private firms."1 A board of directors, who respond inde-
pendently to market conditions in order to maximize profits in the
same way that private firms are operated, determines firm policy. 2 A
governmentally created private company differs principally from a pri-
vate firm in that the government selects its directors and secures the
benefits of its earnings.33
Public corporation form encompasses a greater number of variations
than department or private company form. The public corporation is
not a government department because it has its own board of directors,
accounts, and capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name.3 4 Ex-
cept for appropriations to provide capital or cover operating losses, a
public corporation is independently financed and is not subject to the
budget, accounting, and audit procedures applicable to government de-
partments. Unlike the private company form, the public corporation is
established under separate legislation and is subject to government con-
trol as provided in the statute.35
The question remains which of these principal models of governance
is optimal for a transit enterprise. The directly elected city or regional
officials in charge of a department form enterprise appear to be best
informed on community preferences concerning transit. The inability
of city officials to obtain information regarding transit abates the
strength of this premise. A city council, in particular, lacks organiza-
tion, expertise, time, and interest to cope with the complexities of
transit. Members of a city council must divide their time over a wide
field of complex issues.36
Although a department form enterprise may promote responsive
31. For a discussion of private company form as utilized by the Indonesian Govern-
ment, see R. Prasetya & N. Hamilton, The Regulation of Indonesian State Enterprises,
in LAW AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN ASIA 165-68 (1976).
32. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 9.
33. W. Friedmann, supra note 28, at 310-12; R. POZEN, supra note 10, at xx.
34. W. Friedmann, supra note 28, at 310-25; R. POZEN, supra note 10, at xx.
35. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 9.
36. R.L. Banks & Assocs., Study and Evaluation of Urban Mass Transportation
Regulation and Regulatory Bodies, I SUMMARY & MAIN REP. 83 (1972). For example,
management of one system operated as a department indicated that the mayor's staff
also may have divided attention and lack transit knowledge. To be sure, dramatic issues
or events may inspire interest in transit on the part of council or mayor, but its inci-
dence will be uneven and unpredictable. The less informed the policy-making agencies,
the less that policy will reflect either community preferences or the realities of transit
operations. See Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and
Official Accountability, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8, 24 (1978).
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policies, this form has serious problems in translating policy into oper-
ating objectives and criteria, meaningful performance measurement of
those objectives, and assurance of lowest cost operations. The task of
translating general policies into operating objectives and performance
criteria and monitoring management performance requires policy mak-
ers who can serve as independent counsel in business matters and who
are knowledgeable in transit operations. Day-to-day management of
transit operations demands fultime work and inside knowledge of the
business. The government department model increases the risk that
these tasks will be delegated to a bureaucracy that lacks these essential
characteristics. Decision-making in department form enterprise usu-
ally suffers from insufficient information and lack of responsiveness to
changing market conditions.37 Serious shortcomings of the depart-
ment form enterprise are both the failure to get and act on accurate
information and the lack of flexibility necessary to give initiative and
enterprise full rein.38 Departments are often impervious to change be-
cause of red tape and bureaucracy.3 9
Rigid rules for the purchase of supplies, placing of contracts, and
promotion of personnel are examples of the inflexibility inherent in
government department activity. These rules conflict with accepted
commercial practices and hamper response to the market.40 As an
early United Nations report notes, endowing a government department
with a high degree of operating flexibility is theoretically possible but
empirically difficult.4 1 Strong pressures will be applied to force an en-
terprise to conform to standard government regulations and proce-
37. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 73-75.
38. R. JAILE, supra note 26, 43-44, 81-82.
39. R.L. Banks & Assocs., supra note 36, at 82. Thurston, noting this lack of re-
sponsiveness, comments:
A government department is notoriously poor at adaptation. Hampered by parti-
san control, operating on a fixed yearly budget, bound by rigid rules governing its
purchases, accounting, expenditures, and personnel, unable to borrow on equip-
ment or to expand working capital quickly, embarrassed by immunity from suit
and other legal rules affording special privileges to the government which destroy
commercial confidence and make it impossible to carry on business in accordance
with the usual commercial practice, the government department is a sorry failure
as an entrepreneur.
J. THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN THE ENGLISH SPEAK-
ING COUNTRIES 7 (1937).
40. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 6-7; Tierney, Government Corporations and Manag-
htg the Public's Business, 99 POL. Sci. Q. 73, 75-76 (Spring 1984).
41. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 8.
[Vol. 32:3
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dures as long as it is not clearly differentiated from other types of
governmental activity.4 2
This analysis suggests that the government should create a separate
board to run a transit system under either the private company or pub-
lic corporation model. Company form can be disposed of quite
quickly. General incorporation laws prescribe forms of organization,
financing, and supervision not particularly well adapted to a public in-
stitution.4" The chief advantages of the private company form-lim-
ited liability, pooling of investment, transferability of securities,
perpetual existence, and shareholder supremacy-have little meaning
for a government entity.' Because the company form operates inde-
pendently of the government with profit maximization as a motive, it
will present problems of policy definition and operating objectives for
the allocation of public subsidies and possible lack of control. If the
firm operates as a transit monopoly, it will also face inadequate com-
petitive pressures.
This leaves the public corporation form. The autonomy from gov-
ernment control implicit in this form affords relief to the problems of
insufficient information and lack of responsiveness to changing market
conditions apparent in the department form. The key question is the
optimal governance mechanism for definition of general policy and op-
erating objectives and assurances of lowest cost production. The
Model Act presented below addresses these issues.
III. THE BILL AND COMMENTS
A bill for an act
relating to the governance of mass transit; requiring the develop-
ment of a regional transit board that is responsible for formulating
a statement of policies and for implementing conditions necessary
for producing transit services to meet these policies at lowest
costs; providing for the administration thereof, providing for con-
tracting for transit services; requiring the development of a transit
commission that is responsible for the production of transit serv-
ices; and providing for competitive contract management of the
42. Id.
43. H. Seidman, Government Sponsored Enterprise in the United States, in NEW
POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE PUBLIC USE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 99-100 (B. Smith
ed. 1975); UNTAA, supra note 10, at 18.
44. R. JAILE, supra note 26, at 77.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
14 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:3
transit commission's operations; repealing (state) statutes
(cite) .
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
Section L [DEFINITIONS]
Subd. 1. The following terms as used in this Act have the meaning
given them in this section.
Subd. 2. "Transit Board" means the Regional Transit Board, a
public corporation created pursuant to this Act, which accomplishes
the creation of a public transportation system.
Subd. 3. "Commission" means the Metropolitan Transit Commis-
sion, a public corporation created pursuant to this Act to operate the
transit system.
Subd. 4. "Council" means the Metropolitan Council or other re-
gional government body such as the Metropolitan Planning Organiza-
tion (MPO).
Subd. 5. "Member" means the municipality, county, or political
subdivision that in combination with another member or members
comprises the Transit Board.
Subd. 6. "Municipality" means any city within the regional trans-
portation area.
Subd. 7. "County" means any county within the regional transpor-
tation area.
Subd. 8. "Regional Transportation Area" means any two or more
contiguous municipalities, counties, or political subdivisions, the
boundaries of which are identical to the legal entities that constitute
the authority.
Subd. 9. "Public Transportation System" means, without limita-
tion, a combination of real and personal property, structures, improve-
ments, buildings, equipment, plants, vehicle parking, or other facilities,
and rights of way, or any combination thereof, used or useful for the
purposes of public transportation.
Subd. 10. "Public Transportation" means transportation of passen-
gers by means, without limitation, of a street railway, elevated railway
or guideway, subway, motor vehicle, motor bus, or any bus or other
means of conveyance operating as a common carrier within the re-
gional transportation area, including charter service therein.
Subd. 11. "Board of Directors," hereinafter referred to as the
Board, means the governing body of the Transit Board.
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Subd. 12. "Director" means a person appointed to the Board of
Directors.
Subd. 13. "Commissioner" means a person appointed to the
Commission.
Subd. 14. "Policy" means a course or method of action dictated to
or selected by the Board to guide and determine present and future
decisions.
Comment: Policy can be stated in legislation or regulations creating
or affecting the transit system and through action of the regional gov-
erning body such as a metropolitan council or a board of directors of
the Regional Transit Board. Because the purpose of the organizational
law for a transit system is to maximize the welfare of the people af-
fected by the system, and because the impact of a transit system is
almost entirely local, the Act places responsibility for formulating pol-
icy at the metropolitan level.45
Policy can be organized into four categories that are delineated be-
low for reference. General policy is policy stated in such a high degree
of generality that it becomes an ambiguous goal that provides no gui-
dance to transit management without additional elaboration.4 6 The
state legislature should determine general policy. In contrast, stipula-
tions are policies stated in very specific terms that allow no managerial
flexibility in implementation.47 Minimal performance constraints are a
third category that consists of policies which set absolute minimum
and obvious standards of performance to direct management behavior.
The nonfulfillment of this type of policy indicates poor performance.4 8
Finally, policy can be stated in the form of operating objectives that
guide management action but allow for management expertise to
choose the optimal strategy to reach the objective.4 9 This category is
45. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 48, 54. For example, the
regional government in Minneapolis and St. Paul, the Metropolitan Council, has re-
sponsibility for long-range policy planning. Mid-range planning, one to five years, is the
responsibility of the Regional Transit Board (RTB).
46. For example, a system may be directed to provide adequate and reliable transit
services to meet the community's needs. This type of broad and poorly defined policy is
common in transit systems. See id. at 9, 18-24.
47. For example, systems have been directed to have a load factor on local service at
peak hours of not more than 1.33 passengers per seat. In other cases, the transit board
focuses on operational transactions like the approval of payment of bills. See id. at 24-
25.
48. For example, balanced budget constraints and regular audits are the only stan-
dards of performance for management in some transit systems. See id. at 29-30.
49. See Wolf, supra note 19, at 116-17; Granger, The Hierarchy of Objectives, 42
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defined below in subdivision 15.
Subd. 15. "Operating objective" means a statement of policy made
by the Transit Board or the Council that is translated into operational
terms, particularly the relationship of movement of various passenger
groups to the policies, and that leaves flexibility in operational
implementation.
Comment: The formulation of operating objectives is of critical im-
portance to the success of the model advocated in the Act. Inconsis-
tent social choices and economic waste will result if desired objectives
are not apparent to the decision-maker providing actual transit serv-
ices.50 A lack of objectives also often results in a "management by
crisis" approach to operating the transit system. Dealing with
problems on a last minute basis inevitably raises costs by preventing
selection of low-cost alternatives that require development lead times."
The articulation of operating objectives in terms of passenger mobility
is fully discussed in the comment to section 4, subdivision 3.
Subd. 16. "Performance criteria" are a means of measuring the rel-
ative degree of attainment of the operating objectives.
Comment: In order to avoid a subjective evaluation of the attain-
ment of objectives and to prevent decision makers providing the transit
service from making only a minimum effort, a means of measuring the
HARv. Bus. REv. 63, 66 (1964); See also J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMEN-
TATION xV-xviii (1973).
50. See Granger, supra note 49, at 64; Sheahan, Experience with Public Enterprise in
France and Italy, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 163, 174, 176 (W. Shepherd ed. 1976). A recent study of 30 transit organiza-
tions showed that 20 systems are currently using some form of management by objec-
tives (MBO) process to increase organizational efficiency. M. Meyer & P. Hemily,
Public Transportation in the 1980's: Responding to Pressures of Fiscal Austerity 19-20
(Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript prepared by the Center of Transportation Studies
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the University Research and Training
Program, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington D.C.).
Goals have to be specified and the linkages between the transit service provided
and the well-being of the community must be made explicit.... The problem is of
course how to make goals explicit and how to operationalize them. In this respect,
the trend observed in the survey towards the development of MBO processes in
many agencies might provide a good preliminary base since it establishes a coher-
ent procedure to determine priorities.
Id. at 27.
51. See Granger, supra note 49, at 63; N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note
8, at 27-28; Hamilton, Feldthusen & Crisp, A Comparison of Governance of Publicly-
Owned Mass Transit, 6 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 1, 30 nn.l 12-18 (1983).
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expected performance levels must exist.5 2 Performance criteria are es-
sentially scaled operating objectives that provide a means to determine
whether transit providers are providing services efficiently. Transit effi-
ciency is the lowest-cost production satisfying any given level of an
operating objective.53 Operating objectives and performance criteria
are fully discussed in the comment to section 4, subdivision 3.
Section 2. [POLICY AND GOALS]
Subd. 1. [POLICY]
The legislature finds that, to provide essential mobility and transpor-
tation options in the metropolitan area, to encourage alternatives to the
single-occupant vehicle, and to develop transportation service designed
to maximize public welfare efficiently, a need exists for the creation of
regional transit programs and agencies with the powers and duties pre-
scribed by law.
Subd. 2. [GOALS]
The goals of the transit system are as follows:
(a) to provide a basic level of mobility for all people in the metro-
politan area at the lowest cost with the resources available;
(b) to arrange for the provision of a comprehensive set of transit
and paratransit services to meet the needs of all people in the metropol-
itan area at the lowest cost with the resources available;
(c) to cooperate with private and public transit providers to assure
the most efficient and coordinated use of existing and planned transit
resources; and
(d) to maintain public mobility in the event of emergencies or en-
gergy shortages.
Comment: This provision identifies the need for regional transit pro-
grams and agencies and sets forth the overall goals for the transit sys-
tem. The goals are a course of action stated as general policy. No
stipulations or minimum performance constraints are included.54
52. See D. COOMBES, STATE ENTERPRISE: BUSINESS OR POLITICS 13-14 (1970);
Granger, supra note 49, at 68-69; N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 11,
30, 48, 99; M. Meyer & P. Hemily, supra note 50, at 20-21; Simon, Rational Decison-
Making in Business Organizations 69 AM. ECON. REN'. 493, 500 (1979).
53. Dajani & Gilbert, supra note 19, at 100.
54. For discussion of the importance of formulating operating objectives, see Com-
ment to § 1, subd. 15. For examples of these broad statements of policy used within
transit acts, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 701.02 (Smith-Hurd 1985); MINN. STAT.
§ 473.301 (1984).
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Section 3: [TRANSPORTATION POLICY PLAN]
The Council shall adopt a transportation policy plan. The policy
plan must include policies relating to all transportation forms and be
designed to promote the legislative policies set forth in section 2. The
transit elements of the plan must include the following:
(1) a statement of policies that govern the distribution, coordina-
tion, and general location of facilities, services, and service areas to be
planned, deployed, or developed by or under the direction or auspices
of the Transit Board.
(2) a general statement of timing and priorities in the planning, de-
ployment, and development of services;
(3) a statement of the policies that govern the levels of public ex-
penditure, both capital and operating, for various services and service
areas; and
(4) a statement of the policies that govern total annual regional
funding levels, the sources of funds, and the distribution of funds
among the facilities, services, and service areas.
Comment: Political accountability is best satisfied if transit policies
are made almost entirely at the local level and not the federal or state
level. Policies should reflect the preferences of the local region princi-
pally affected by the transit system. Policy decisions rendered at the
state and federal level demonstrate specialized expertise, but often suf-
fer from lack of information concerning local conditions.
Because mass transit policy is just one aspect of urban transportation
policy, which is part of urban development generally, the traditional
view subsumes transit services under an overall regional development
plan formulated by policy makers answerable to the regional commu-
nity. The theory is that without such regional planning, local commu-
nities may capture the benefits that their neighbors generate and
impose the costs of their own policies on others. In addition, policies
that differ among communities do not necessarily incorporate an over-
all conception of development for the entire region.
As a practical matter, however, regional planning in many urban
areas has been largely a disappointment and has played only a margi-
nal role in these areas. One reason for this is that local governments
and agencies are reluctant to relinquish their power. The Legislature
must, therefore, grant the regional planning agency policy-making and
enforcement capabilities, or the local communities may threaten to end
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negotiations and to reject proposed plans as a form of manipulation.55
Section 4: [REGIONAL TRANSIT BOARD]
Subd. 1. [CREATION OF THE TRANSIT BOARD] To achieve
the goals of section 2 and to carry out the policy plan required by sec-
tion 3, a Regional Transit Board is established as a public corporation
and a political subdivision of the state.
Comment: Through this general enabling legislation, a separate
agency (the Regional Transit Board) can be established to create a
transit system. Different combinations of local governments may form
a regional transit board to plan and finance transit services. The
Transit Board then becomes essentially another layer of government,
independent of other local jurisdictions.56
Current legislation, which creates a single transit authority to plan,
finance, and produce transit services, is deficient because of ambiguous
legislative intent concerning the desired type of legal model. Whether
the legislative body intended to create something similar to a private
corporation, a department of a municipal corporation, or an independ-
ent public corporation is often difficult to determine.57 As a result, no
clearly understood and accepted model exists to guide the determina-
tion of policy or the conduct of operations, nor is there an accepted
theory of organizational law for transit. Political or practical feasibil-
ity within each agency provides the structure for most policies and
managerial techniques." This lack of a generally accepted decision-
making model leads to confusion concerning the responsibilities of the
various groups involved in transit such as labor, management, the
Transit Board policy makers, and local, state, and federal governments.
The decision-making model proposed in the Act clearly allocates spe-
cific responsibilities to the various groups involved in planning, financ-
ing, and producing transit service.
This statutory provision could be worded to allow any political sub-
55. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 94-95.
56. For a synopsis of the organizational approach to the Chicago RTA, a similarly
structured transit system, see Memorandum from Schlickman, Intergovernmental Af-
fairs Officer, to Chairman Cardilli and CTA Board Members regarding RTA Legisla-
tion (Nov. 8, 1983) [hereinafter Schlickman]; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112b, 701.10-
703. 10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. §§ 473.371-394 (1984). A diagram-
matic explanation of the proposed organizational scheme is provided in Appendix A of
the text.
57. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 10.
58. See id. at 31; Horn, Transit Boards, How Do They Work?, TRANSIT J. 67, 68-69
(1977).
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division or group of subdivisions to incorporate a regional transit
board, rather than to statutorily authorize a specific regional transit
board for a particular group of municipalities. An alternative provi-
sion could read:
Subd. 1. [CREATION OF THE TRANSIT BOARD (Alternative
Provision)] The legislative body of any municipality, county, or polit-
ical subdivision may incorporate a regional transit board as a public
corporation and a political subdivision of the state to achieve the goals
of section 2 and to carry out the policy plan required by section 3. The
Transit Board shall be authorized all the powers and duties of this Act
with respect to the public transportation system within the territorial
boundaries of the regional transportation area that incorporates the
Transit Board.
The Transit Board shall not exercise any of the powers hereby
granted until articles of incorporation are adopted by an affirmative
vote of the electors of each political subdivision. The manner of adop-
tion shall be as follows: The governing body of any political subdivi-
sion may direct that the question of adoption of this section be
submitted to the electors therein at any general, special, judicial, or
local election. The clerk of such municipality, county, or political sub-
division shall thereupon submit the question to popular vote. Public
notice of the election shall be given at least twenty days prior to the
election. If a majority of those voting on the question vote in the af-
firmative, this section shall be adopted in such municipality, county, or
political subdivision.
Subd. 2. [POWERS OF THE TRANSIT BOARD]
(a) The Transit Board has the power and duties imposed by law.
The exercise of any powers by the Transit Board must be consistent
with the exercise by the Council of any of its powers.
(b) The Transit Board may sue and be sued.
(c) The Transit Board may enter into contracts necessary to carry
out its responsibilities.
(d) The Transit Board may acquire by purchase, lease, gift, or
grant property and interests in property necessary for the accomplish-
ment of its purposes and may sell or otherwise dispose of property that
it no longer requires.
(e) The Transit Board may make and adopt all rules and regula-
tions and bylaws as may be necessary or desirable to enable it to exer-
cise the powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed on it by
the provisions of this Act.
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(f) The Transit Board may appoint such officers and employees as
it may require for the performance of its duties and fix and determine
their qualifications, duties, and compensation. The Transit Board may
retain or employ counsel, auditors, engineers, and private consultants
on a contract basis or otherwise for rendering professional or technical
services and advice.
Comment: The Transit Board's independence and freedom from
bias in policy-making and performance review will be seriously ques-
tioned if the Transit Board relies solely on the transit producers to pro-
vide planning and performance data. The Transit Board must have its
own staff to provide planning input data, to design operating objectives
and performance criteria, and to evaluate whether the criteria have
been met.59
(g) When necessary and proper to the performance of its duties,
the Transit Board may enter in a reasonable manner upon any prem-
ises for the purpose of making any reasonably necessary or proper in-
vestigations and examinations. The entry is not a trespass. The
Transit Board is liable for any actual and consequential loss, injury, or
damage from the entry. When necessary and proper to the perform-
ance of its duties, the Transit Board or its authorized agents may re-
quire the production of accounts, books, records, memoranda,
correspondence, and other documents and papers of a person or entity
receiving financial assistance from the Transit Board, may inspect and
copy them, and may have access to and inspect the lands, buildings,
facilities, or equipment of the person or entity.
(h) The Transit Board may require any employee to obtain and file
with it an individual bond or fidelity insurance policy. The Transit
Board may procure insurance in the amounts it deems necessary
against the liability of the board or its officers and employees.
(i) The Transit Board may, for any of its purposes, apply for, ac-
cept, and disbuse gifts, grants, or loans from the United States, the
State, or from any person or entity on behalf of itself or any of its
contract recipients. The Transit Board may enter into any agreement
required for the gifts, grants, or loans and may hold, use, and dispose
of money or property received therefrom according to the terms of the
gift, grant, or loan. When the Transit Board has adopted an approved
implementation plan and has certified to the governor that it is ready to
receive federal funds, the governor shall take whatever steps necessary
59. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 113, 119-20.
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to designate the Transit Board as a recipient of federal transit assist-
ance for the regional transportation area.
(j) The Transit Board may establish one or more advisory commit-
tees composed of and representing transit providers, transit users, and
local units of government to advise it in carrying out its purposes. The
members of advisory committees serve without compensation.
Comment: Citizen's advisory committees are one means of making
planning more sensitive to community needs. Viable citizen's advisory
committees require: (1) clear and achievable objectives for citizens;
(2) specific criteria for citizen selection; and (3) public credibility of
agency personnel.60
(k) The Transit Board may conduct research studies and programs
or may contract with other persons for research studies and programs.
The Transit Board may advise and assist the Council and other govern-
ment units on transportation issues within its jurisdiction.
(1) The Transit Board shall develop an implementation plan as
specified in subdivision 3.
(m) The Transit Board shall offer, use, and apply its services to
assist and advise transit providers in the metropolitan transit area in
the planning, promotion, development, operation, and evaluation of
programs and projects that are undertaken or proposed to be under-
taken by contract with the Transit Board, and shall seek out and select
recipients of this assistance and advice.
(n) The Transit Board may provide financial assistance to the
Commission and other providers as provided herein in furtherance of
and in conformance with the implementation plan of the Transit
Board.
(o) The Transit Board shall coordinate transit operations within
the metropolitan area and shall establish a transit information program
60. For a general discussion supporting the use of Citizen's Advisory Committees,
see Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research Record No. 555, Citi-
zen's Role in Transportation Planning (1975). Citizen's advisory groups have been uti-
lized with success in such companies as AT&T, Pennsylvania Power & Light,
Wisconsin Public Service Commission, and Texas Electric Service. Boulier, What
Others Think, 108 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 65 (Dec. 3, 1981). Still another utility, Kansas
City Power & Light, has used a citizen's advisory group to help chart a long-term least-
cost strategy to meet the energy needs of its customers through the year 2000. Smartt,
Pages with the Editor, 108 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 7 (Dec. 17, 1981).
Following the utilities' lead, both the Illinois and Minnesota legislatures have
adopted enabling provisions establishing Citizen's Advisory Boards. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. I11A, 703.08, 703A.11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
§ 473.375(9) (1984).
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to provide transit users with accurate information on transit schedules
and service.
(p) The Transit Board shall annually submit a report to the Coun-
cil, the governor, and the legislature detailing its activities and finances
for the previous year.
Subd. 3. [IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]
(a) [REQUIREMENT] The Transit Board shall adopt a transit ser-
vice implementation plan describing the planning, functions, and activ-
ities to be performed by or under the direction or auspices of the
Transit Board in implementing the policy plan adopted by the Council
or the MPO. The plan must cover at least the five-year period com-
mencing with the first calendar year beginning after the plan's ap-
proval. The plan shall be updated annually.
(b) [CONTENT] The implementation plan of the Transit Board
must contain at least the following elements:
(i) A description of the needs for transit services required to meet
the policies in the Council's or the MPO's policy plan, based upon de-
tailed surveys and analysis of service areas and markets identified in the
Council's policy plan;
(ii) A detailed description of services and facilities planned to
meet these needs, including an indication of priorities and timing
among them;
(iii) A detailed statement of proposed delivery methods and
producers;
(iv) A schedule of expected levels of public expenditure, both cap-
ital and operating, for the services and facilities planned;
(v) A schedule showing the expected sources of funds, including
proceeds of bonds of the Transit Board and the Commission, areas and
levels of taxes, user charges, and state and federal subsidies;
(vi) A plan and schedule showing the distribution of funds among
various services, service areas and markets, and producers; and
(vii) A detailed statement of transit service operating objectives
and performance criteria for each proposed delivery method and pro-
posed producers.
Comment: In order for transit policies to reflect community prefer-
ences, the community must be informed as to how local policy makers
exercise their power to formulate policy. Policymakers should be di-
rected to regularly formulate a statement of policies to facilitate the
flow of information to the community. A publicly stated policy plan of
the Council is one step in this direction. Clearly, however, a "laundry
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list" of general policies will not adequately inform either the commu-
nity or the providers of transit services of the desired type of output.
General policy provides little direction to, and almost no control over,
producers of transit services. Producers can trade off general policy
goals as they desire.6" The policies of an organization must be con-
nected operationally with actions or the resulting ambiguity will allow
self-interested management to set policy.62 Thus, the Transit Board's
implementation plan is a necessary second step in adequately informing
the community, directing transit producers, and holding producers
accountable.
In order to direct producers and inform the community, the Transit
Board must translate the policies of the Council into clear and consis-
tent operating objectives. 63 Because the output and utility of a transit
system is the movement of passengers, not empty seats, the operating
objectives of a system should be passenger mobility objectives. 64 Pas-
senger mobility can be measured in many ways. The simplest way, for
example, is a calculation of the number of travelers and the distance
traveled on any given day.65 This type of aggregate mobility measure
may not, however, satisfy the general policies of a system relating to,
for example, reduction of congestion or to specific income redistribu-
tion policies concerning the handicapped.
A more refined approach to defining and measuring the output of a
transit system would translate the Transit Board's general policies into
61. Multiple and contradictory goals will lead to poor performance. Tierney, supra
note 40, at 90. See N. HAMILTON & R. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 16, 98; S. BREYER,
supra note 16, at 79. As Liebenstein points out, multiplicity of goals will also result in
more inefficiency in production. H. LIEBENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 174.
62. Simon, supra note 52, at 500.
63. See R. Mundy, Mass Transit Guidelines Versus a Consumer Orientation in Pub-
lic Transportation Systems 2 (1977) (unpublished manuscript); Bhatt, Institutional
Framework and Public Enterprise Performance, 12 WORLD DEv. 713, 715 (1984). Un-
less clear objectives are given, the details of the agency's decisions are not susceptible to
effective review and thus overall performance cannot be precisely evaluated. R.
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 17. Without effective evaluation, the inherent tension
between delegation of broad authority and the need for regulation of performance is
increased. Id. If subordinates are supplied with clear objectives in keeping with organi-
zational goals, performance may be evaluated without monitoring details of decision-
making. Id. at 18.
64. See Dajani & Gilbert, supra note 19, at 97, 99. See also G. FIELDING & R.
GLAUTHIER, DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOCATION OF TRANSIT SUBSIDIES IN CALIFOR-
NIA 15 (1976).
65. A. TOMAZINIS, PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY IN URBAN TRANS-
PORTATION SYSTEMS 179 (1975).
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desired levels of mobility for defined groups.6 6 Mobility defined in
terms of the movement of targeted groups also captures the goal of
accessibility of the system, because the achievement of a certain move-
ment objective cannot be reached unless the system is accessible.
The objectives should, therefore, be stated in terms of desired levels
of movement for different groups of the population, such as commut-
ers, the elderly, children, low-income people, or residents of certain
geographical areas subject to a budget constraint.67 Some policies,
such as reduction in congestion, may be easier to state in mobility
terms than others, such as management of urban growth. Each objec-
tive, however, should be viewed as a hypothesis concerning the rela-
tionship of various passenger group movement to the general policies.
In reality, the relationship between the groups' mobility and the policy
may not occur as hypothesized. The setting of objectives will, there-
66. For example, in order to effect a policy of reduction in congestion, the correla-
tion between commuter's increased transit use and reduction in congestion must be as-
certained. The appropriate amount of congestion abatement must be determined; the
corresponding increase in passenger mobility for commuters thus becomes an objective
of the system. Arthur Anderson & Co., Project FARE Task IV Report, Task and Pro-
ject Summary 1-3 (1973).
67. R. WINNIE & H. HATRY, MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT SERVICES: TRANSPORTATION 1, 59-64 (1973). It is possible to define a pro-
cedure for weighting passenger miles so that the maximization of weighted passenger
miles subject to a budget constraint maximizes net social benefit. See Glaisler & Col-
lings, Maximization of Passenger Miles in Theory and Practice, 12 J. TRANSP. ECON. &
POL. 304, 321 (1978); See also Bos, Distributional Effects of Maximization of Passenger
Miles, 12 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL. 322, 329 (1978); Nash, Management Objectives,
Fares and Service Levels in Bus Transport, 12 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'Y 70, 85 (1978).
Of course, decision makers may prefer to conceal distributional weights to avoid ac-
countability for their decisions. R. SUDGEN & A. WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 238-39 (1978). A clear-cut system of determin-
ing weights rather than the implicit use of weights in an ad hoc manner will substan-
tially increase accountability to the public. D. PEARCE & C. NASH, THE SOCIAL
APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS 37 (1981). The monitoring and collecting of passenger infor-
mation useful to ensuring contract performance of stated objectives could be performed
effectively through electronic means. See Goldsack, Electronics Breakthrough, Collect-
ing Fares and Facts, 9 MASS TRANSIT 19 (Nov. 1982); Demoro, Zoned vs. Flat Fares, 10
MASS TRANSIT 12 (May 1983). But see R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 20.
Schmalensee agrees that a system of distributive weights could be attached to the real
incomes of various segments of society to account for the effects of price changes on
different economic groups. Id. at 21. Schmalensee believes no viable way exists, how-
ever, to provide regulators with such a set of distributive weights, and because allowing
regulators to devise their own is not an appealing prospect, "the system should be aimed
at efficient resource use and evaluated by its success in meeting that goal." Id. at 21, 40.
The Model Act makes the Transit Board politically accountable for these distributive
weight determinations.
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fore, be a trial-and-error process, and mobility objectives must be rede-
fined from time to time as experience is gained.
The mere statement of clear general policy and operating objectives
provides information to the community and directs management efforts
but does not provide a basis to measure the adequacy of management's
performance. If objectives are defined without any method of measur-
ing performance, evaluation is subjective aid calls forth only the mini-
mum threshold effort that management believes will satisfy the review.
Objectives whose performance criteria define expected performance
levels in specific measurable terms can provide this measurement capa-
bility. 68 Thus, the legislation also charges the Transit Board to develop
performance criteria for purposes of measuring the degree to which the
operating objectives are achieved. 69 Criteria are essentially scaled op-
erating objectives. One definition of achievement, for example, could
be the increase in the movement of handicapped. High achievement in
terms of the scaled criteria, however, does not alone measure the per-
formance or efficiency of management. The question arises, at what
cost were the mobility criteria reached? Transit efficiency is the lowest
cost production satisfying any given level of a mobility objective. 70
Thus, a first and second condition of cost minimization is the defini-
tion of clear operating objectives and performance criteria. Simplicity
is desirable. The fewer the policies and objectives and the fewer the
decisions in implementation and supervision, the more likely that the
policy will ultimately be realized.71
Preservtion of transit producers' autonomy over operational deci-
sions is another prerequisite for cost minimization. The statute's dele-
gation of duties makes clear that the Transit Board is not to make
operational decisions. Producers of transit are to have sole control
over operational decisions, and the Transit Board's scope of authority
is limited to developing operating objectives and evaluating whether
they have been met. Local policymakers cannot devise cost-minimiz-
ing production strategies that require full-time work and inside knowl-
edge of a business, its markets, its products, and its technologies.
68. The Transit Board must establish tentative criteria in the form of standards for
measuring the success of the broader objective. These are the yardsticks to measure the
success of the state objective. The more tangible the yardsticks are, the more usable
they will be. Granger, supra note 49, at 68-69.
69. D. COOMBES, supra note 52, at 167.
70. Dajani & Gilbert, supra note 19, at 100.
71. J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 49, at 143.
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Stipulations dictated by policymakers lead to uninformed and unre-
sponsive production decisions, and consequently to waste and to lost
opportunities. Transit producers, not the Transit Board, are in the
most informed position to make resources productive in the pursuit of
the enterprise's objectives.72 If producers lack freedom to follow their
own production strategy in pursuing operating objectives, they cannot
be expected to achieve lowest cost production.
The differences between policy and the production process or day-to-
day management remain to be outlined.7 3 Realistically, no bright line
separates policy from operations. The two concepts are merely part of
a spectrum of decision-making that ranges from the most general ques-
tions of what service to produce and for whom, to specific questions
concerning marketing or production. Thus, to reduce both the inher-
ent ambiguity in the concepts and the risk of policymaker's interfer-
ence in operations, the Transit Board should delineate a clearer
definition of the areas of transit producer authority.74
The Act's approach is to give producers sole control over all deci-
sions that require detailed knowledge of the production function and
market characteristics. Those who actually manage the provision of
the service determine transit efficiency, which is a function of the tech-
nical relationships between inputs and outputs.
75
72. Drucker, The Real Duties of a Director, Wall St. J., June 1, 1978, at 20, cols. 3-
5.
73. Much of the British literature on government enterprise simply assumes that a
fine line can be drawn between policy and day-to-day management. See W. ROBSON,
NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 139, 141-42 (1960).
Even though the dichotomy between day-to-day operations and policy determination
is well recognized, it is not enough to say only that broad policy decisions must be
distinguished from transit operational decisions. With no clear distinction drawn be-
t'veen the two, supervisory agencies tend to encroach on the details of providing the
service. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 27-28, 110-11.
74. To reduce the inherent risk of Transit Board interference in operations due to
ambiguous definitions, Friedmann advocates that statutory guidelines clearly spell out
the distinction between policy and operations. Friedmann, supra note 28, at 307. The
vagueness of these statutory mandates is often a cause of observed regulatory inade-
quacy and, therefore, the regulator's mandates should be narrowed. R. SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 10, at 62. "Inability to predict actual behaviors from knowledge of institu-
tional structure suggests at least that the interests of effective administration are ill-
served by grants of excessive discretion. Id. at 145. See supra note 10 for
discussion.
75. See Dajani & Gilbert, supra note 19, at 100. These variables essentially involve
routine business decisions made in the context of the private corporate governance
model. The variables include operational components such as maintenance, rout-
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This division of responsibilities between the Transit Board and
transit producers helps to clarify the role of those producing the service
and the role of the Transit Board in the regulatory process. A simpler,
more understandable structure would reduce information costs in-
curred both by the Transit Board in monitoring producers and by the
community in monitoring the Transit Board.76 The separation of the
planning and financing from the operating of transit will also lead to
ing/scheduling, service characteristics, personnel matters, labor relations, and promo-
tional activity. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 11, at 13-15.
76. An example of a transit system that has carefully separated the planning, finan-
cial, and operations aspects is found in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 473.371-.449 (1984). As in the Model Act, the organization of the
Minnesota Act is three-tiered. The Minnesota Act clearly leaves the broad, overall met-
ropolitan policy planning to the Metropolitan Council, whose duty is to consider and
coordinate transit services along with the many other functions necessary to operate in a
large area.
A separate entity, the Regional Transit Board (RTB), carries out the policies to
achieve the objectives and goals necessary for the provision of essential mobility and
transit operations in the metropolitan area. The RTB is responsible for mid-range plan-
ning, implementing transit plans, MINN. STAT. § 473.377, providing financial assistance
for transit producers, id. § 473.375(13), contracting with producers, id. § 473.384, and
preparing a transit budget that is subject to the Metropolitan Council's review and ap-
proval. Id. § 473.38.
Finally, the Act creates the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), which is re-
sponsible for preparing the actual operations and service plans submitted to the RTB
for approval, MINN. STAT. § 473.405(6), and for either operating the public transit sys-
tem directly or entering into contracts for management services. Id. § 473.405(12).
These three divisions keep transit planning in perspective with overall metropolitan
goals and place mid- and short-range planning on levels closer to decision-making cen-
ters more familiar with and responsive to the day-to-day operations.
Contrast the above with the Illinois Regional Transportation Authority Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 4 701.01-705.05 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). Under the Illinois
Act, a two-tiered system exists. The first tier consists of the Regional Transit Authority
(RTA), which is responsible for overseeing the second tier, which consists of three "Ser-
vice Boards"-the CTA, the Suburban Bus Division, and the Commuter Rail Division.
The RTA, like the Metropolitan Council, is responsible for long-range overall transit
policy, id. f 702.01, and for transit budget approval. Id. % 704.11(2). Like the RTB, the
RTA is also responsible for setting guidelines for grants to providers and purchasing
service contracts, id. 702.02, and for financial planning. The combination of broad
policy planning and financial planning, resting within one department whose single con-
cern is transit, may be too narrow a base to efficiently integrate transportation with
other aspects of metropolitan planning.
A further blurring of functions occurs on the "Service Board" levels that combine
many of the duties of the Minnesota RTB and MTC. For example, like the RTB, the
Suburban Bus Division is responsible for mid-range planning and determining the level,
nature, and kind of transportation that should be provided. Id. t 702.01. Similar to the
MTC, however, the Suburban Bus Division is also responsible for either directly operat-
ing the public transit facilities or entering into contracts for services. Id. 702.03.
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more innovation in transit because the Transit Board may experiment
with new types of services or contracting for services without losing
either funds or power.77
Subd. 4 [CONTRACTS]
(a) The Transit Board shall make contracts with eligible recipients
for financial assistance to produce transit service within the metropoli-
tan area. The Transit Board may not give financial assistance to a
transit producer other than the Commission without first having exe-
cuted a contract.
(b) To be eligible to receive financial assistance by contract under
this section a recipient must be:
(i) a county, statutory, or home rule charter city or town or com-
bination thereof, or public corporation organized and existing pursuant
to state law providing financial assistance to or operating public transit;
or
(ii) a private producer of public transit.
(c) The Transit Board shall establish procedures and standards for
review and approval of applications for financial assistance under this
section consistent with its approved implementation plan.
The Transit Board shall refine the operating objectives and perform-
ance criteria in the implementation plan as necessary to permit bidding
by potential financial assistance recipients on the performance level of
the operating objectives achievable by the recipient with the revenues
available from federal, Transit Board, or other financial assistance, and
the farebox. In order to gather information in preparation for bidding
by potential financial aid recipients, the Transit Board shall require
that prior to applying for financial assistance by contract under clause
(a) of this subdivision, the applicant prepare and submit a transit study
that must include the following elements:
(i) a determination of existing and future transit needs within the
area to be served, and an assessment of the adequacy of existing service
to meet the needs;
(ii) an assessment of the level and type of service required to meet
unmet needs;
Thus, policy makers are also operation decision makers, which may lead to uninformed
and unresponsive production.
77. Lave, The Private Challenge to Public Transportation-An Overview, in URBAN
TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 1, 26-27.
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(iii) an assessment of existing and future resources available for
the financing of transit service; and
(iv) the type or types of any new government arrangements or
agreements needed to produce adequate service.
The Transit Board may assist any applicant in the preparation of the
transit study.
(d) Prior to bidding, the Transit Board shall make data on avail-
able subsidies and all previous contracts and their performance avail-
able to all eligible recipients. The Transit Board shall require the
submission of a service plan from each eligible recipient submitting a
bid. The service plan must include the following elements:
(i) a description of the service proposed for financial assistance,
including vehicles, routes, and schedules;
(ii) a description of the amount required to establish and operate
the proposed services and the proposed sources of the required
amount, including farebox revenue and financial assistance from the
Transit Board and other local, state, or federal sources;
(iii) the fare structure of the proposed service;
(iv) a proposal outlining what level of the performance criteria
the bidder will achieve during the contract period;
(v) the financial or other information the Transit Board requires
to carry out its duties; and
(vi) a description of the contract administration and review
process.
(e) The Transit Board shall screen out bidders not competent to
adequately perform the contract.
(f) The Transit Board may specify procedures, including public
hearing requirements, to be followed by applicants that are cities,
towns, counties, or combinations thereof in conducting transit studies
and formulating service plans.
(g) For 10 years following the enactment of this statute, prior to
entering into a contract for operating assistance with a recipient other
than the Commission, the Transit Board shall evaluate the effect, if
any, of the contract on the ridership, routes, schedules, fares, and staff-
ing levels of the existing and proposed service provided by the Com-
mission. A copy of the assessment must be provided to the
Commission. The Transit Board shall make a finding whether the ser-
vice to be assisted under the contract will impose a hardship on the
ridership or the financial condition of the Commission.
(h) Except when the assessment under clause (g) of this subdivision
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results in a finding of undue hardship to the Commission, the Transit
Board shall select, from the responsible bidders, the bidder(s) commit-
ted to the highest level of performance of the operating objectives. For
10 years following the enactment of this statute, in the event of a find-
ing of hardship to the Commission, the Transit Board shall give con-
sideration to this factor in awarding contracts.
(i) The Transit Board may utilize reward and penalty clauses for
superior and inadequate contract performance respectively.
Comment: Clear objectives and criteria and management autonomy
are necessary conditions but are not in themselves sufficient to ensure
lowest cost production. Government enterprises operating monopoly
franchises are not subject to competitive pressures to minimize costs.
Without such pressures, these firms can waste resources through mana-
gerial slack and inertia. This waste includes costs incurred in excess of
those that a competitive firm would incur and dampened incentives for
invention and innovation. Thus, the third necessary element for effi-
ciency is the existence of competitive pressures on management to
achieve the objectives at lowest cost.
The question is whether the valuable characteristics of market solu-
tions can be retained to spur lowest cost production of transit services.
The optimal result is a market consisting of a number of unfranchised
suppliers-either government or private enterprises-who are all striv-
ing to offer the best particular product or service and competing for
available subsidy dollars. This outcome is ideal because each produc-
ing firm faces the same environment, and selection among them is au-
tomatic by virtue of profit performance and free entry. The normal
optimal competitive result applies here. If, however, the minimum op-
timal scale of transit producers is large relative to the size of the mar-
ket, the market will consist of only a few producers and oligopoly
distortions might attenuate the efficiencies that occur from competitive
pressures.78
Before publicly owned transit monopolies were created in the 1960s,
the record suggested that the minimum optimal scale of private bus
transit firms in many cities was sufficiently large to lead to monopoly
production or a market consisting of few producers.7 9 This result
could also be explained by artificial regulatory restraints on entry im-
78. In the extreme case, when the market is so small that only one producer can
achieve minimum optimal scale, no competition will exist at all except through the
possibility of franchise bidding or bidding for management contracts discussed below.
79. R.L. Banks & Assocs., supra note 36, at 70-74.
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posed at that time, which permitted existing firms to generate monop-
oly profits in some services in order to cross-subsidize loss-producing
activities.8"
Statistical data on scale economies and minimum optimal scale of
bus transit firms reveals very limited, if any, economies of scale.81
Studies conclude that: costs are directly proportional to bus miles pro-
duced;82 units costs are rising disproportionately with respect to fleet
size;83 and average operating costs are, in the long run, rising dispro-
portionately with respect to passenger miles produced.84 If passenger
waiting time and travel time are included as costs, studies show that
costs decrease with respect to bus miles because more frequent service
and a well coordinated system of routes reduces waiting and travel
time.85 The implication of this data86 is that the transit market can
consist of competing smaller producers rather than one larger producer
in many cities, and that competition among the producers may result
in cost savings. Two producers might serve medium sized urban areas
80. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 67. Lave, supra note 77, at 5;
Kemp & Kirby, supra note 4, at 185-86.
81. The consensus among researchers is that significant economies of scale do not
exist in urban bus transit. Lave, supra note 77, at 246. Economies of scale for fixed
guideway mass transit may exist and justify natural monopoly characterization. See
Kemp & Kirby, supra note 4, at 287-88.
Essentially constant costs prevail for producers up to about 5.5 million vehicle-miles
per year (about the size of the Albany, N.Y. system), and at the level of the largest
producers, quite large diseconomies of scale prevail. Morlok & Viton, The Comparative
Costs ofPublic and Private Providers ofMass Transit, in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4,
at 233, 246.
82. Lee & Steadman, Economies ofScale in Bus Transport, 4 J. TRANSP. L. & POL'Y
15, 27 (1979); but see Williams, Firm Size and Operating Costs in Urban Bus Transporta-
tion, 8 J. INDUS. EcON. 209, 216 (1979) (concludes that long-run marginal cost de-
creases as annual bus miles increase).
83. Wabe & Coles, The Short-Run and Long-Run Costs of Urban Buses, 9 J.
TRANSP. EON. & POL'Y 127-40 (1975); Miller, Differences Among Cities, Differences
Among Firms, and Costs of Urban Bus Transport, 19 J. INDUS. EON. 22-32 (1970);
Pucher, Markstedt & Hirschman, supra note 5, at 166.
84. Oberg, Bus Transit Cost, Productivity and Factor Substitution, 19 J. TRANSP.
ECON. & POL'Y 183, 189, 201 (1985).
85. Mohring, Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation, 62
AM. EcON. REV. 585, 591-93 (1972). This latter data does not necessarily point toward
natural monopoly in transit services, because transit planning and contracting for well
defined services could also reduce waiting time and travel time.
86. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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while six to ten firms might serve the largest transit markets.8 7 Even
with just two producers, the problem of market power concentration
appears slight because non-legal barriers to entry such as start-up costs
are low and minimum optimal scale is small.8"
Currently, private bus services are not well developed because pub-
licly produced mass transit services are subsidized89 and the regulatory
power of the publicly-owned transit producer prevents private opera-
tors from producing service.9° A third barrier to entry of private
transit is the mindset of transit management, which favors traditional
transit monopolies and opposes any diminution in their control over
transit.91 Nonetheless, the number of private transit firms is growing,
and as these barriers to entry are reduced more private firms will
appear.
92
87. Id. See also Schofer, Routes to the Future of Urban Public Transit, 29 URB.
Arr. Q. 149, 153 (1983).
88. Morlok & Viton, supra note 81, at 246-47.
89. Viton, Privately Provided Transport Services, 16 J. TRANSP. EcON. & POL'Y 85,
91-92 (1982).
90. Giuliano & Teal, Privately Provided Commuter Bus Services: Experiences,
Problems, and Prospects, in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 151, 177-78. The ap-
proach in the past has been consolidation into a publicly owned monopoly. Johnson &
Pikarski, Toward Fragmentation: The Evolution of Public Transportation in Chicago, in
URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 49, 73.
91. Giuliano & Teal, supra note 90, at 177-78. These barriers to private production
are very substantial. As the Wall Street Journal recently noted:
Despite its undeniably enormous potential, privatization of government services in
general, and of transportation in particular, will not be developed unless the finan-
cial community, government at the local, state and federal levels, and the public
recognize the extent to which existing laws, regulations, customs and lending prac-
tices limit private efforts to construct and maintain the infra structure.
Gilsen, Private Transportation is a Pipe Dream, Wall St. J., May 26, 1985, at F2, col. 3.
92. For example, charter bus and school bus companies already exist and can
quickly respond to market opportunities in fixed route transit. Schofer, supra note 87,
at 154-55 (1983). In a number of urban areas, private firms operating under contract
are producing part, or in some cases all, of the transit service.
See Lave, supra note 77, at 14-16; Orski, The Private Challenge to Public Transporta-
tion in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 311, 327. One example of the success of
privatization of public transit can be found in the Minneapolis suburb of Plymouth,
which recently "opted out" of the public bus system and substituted private producers.
Within seven months, the daily ridership increased 18%. Adams, Metrolink Outpaces
MTC in Plymouth, Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Sept. 28, 1984, at Bl, col. 1.
In Dallas, private companies operate regular high volume commuter services with
their own buses under contracts with the transit authority. In a newer variation of this
theme, the transit authority will own the buses that the private companies will operate.
Hayes, Dallas Negotiates Its Way Out of the Computer Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1986, at E5, cols. 1-5.
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The effort to obtain the benefits of competitive pressures on produc-
tion costs must not sacrifice the benefits of governmental agency over-
sight of regional coordination and policy development, which ensures
that the public's tax dollars are spent in a way that maximizes the
community's welfare. The Act delegates coordinated policy-making
functions to the Council and the Transit Board. The benefits of compe-
tition are realized through competitive bid contracts for service, and
transit service producers bidding on contracts can be publicly owned or
privately owned entities. 93
Because of the uncertainty surrounding both the nature of the transit
producer markets that will emerge in the future and the workability of
untried contractual arrangements, the Act gives maximum flexibility to
the Transit Board to experiment with contractual arrangements best
suited to changing market conditions. For example, the best option for
fixed route service might be to contract out individual routes, or to
divide the metropolitan area into districts and contract out districts, or
93. Kolderie was one of the first scholars to emphasize this distinction between gov-
ernment provision and government production of a good or service. He advocates that
governments remain the providers of important services, but that they get out of mo-
nopoly production through contracting for services. The key, according to Kolderie, is
to obtain the benefits of competition among producers for the service contract. Produ-
cers can be either government or private enterprises. Kolderie, supra note 17, at 6.
"The essential mode of operation for a local government setting out to change the com-
munity service system.., is not to do things itself as a producer, but to let things be
done by others. Id. at 9. To reduce financial commitments and gain better control over
costs, greater use must be made of private sector providers. M. Pikarski & C. Johnson,
supra note 1, at 19, 26-27. "Rather than owning and operating systems, the public
sector may become more of a travel information broker, a facilitator, a technical adviser
and a manager of set service contracts." Id. at 27. See also M. Bendick, Jr., On the
Efficiency of Markets Created by Government: A Review of Recent Experience with
the For-Profit Privatization of Public Services 2-9 (July 1982) (paper prepared for the
Urban Institute and presented at the conference on Social Needs and Business Opportu-
nities); C. Lave, The Private Challenge to Public Transportation 22-31 (Mar. 18, 1984)
(unpublished manuscript, Economics Department, University of California, Irvine).
The author's earlier book points out that competition among suppliers to produce a
good or service, which the government financed, is a preferred solution if (1) govern-
ment policy makers can create the proper incentives to elicit desired behavior from
private firms, and (2) enough suppliers exist to result in workable competition. See N.
HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 66-71. Case studies in transit revealed
severe shortcomings, however, in the definition of policy by boards, and the data avail-
able in 1980 was more ambiguous concerning minimum optimal scale in bus transit and
the possibility of competition in production. Given this information, the book focuses
on introducing competition through bidding for contract management in order to intro-
duce pressure for lowest cost production. See id. at 105-09. The Model Act is also
drafted to permit experimentation with competition for contract management of the
transit commission.
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to allow more than one operator on given routes or in certain dis-
tricts.9 4 Thus, if the market consists of a number of unfranchised sup-
pliers competing with one another, this competition will ensure lowest
cost production. Even if a market contains only one firm that theoreti-
cally produces at lowest cost, available research indicates that periodi-
cally inviting a number of enterprises to bid for the opportunity to
operate a franchise is more efficient. Contract bidding may be signifi-
cantly more efficient than monopoly public production if a number of
producers are willing to bid at each contract renewal.95
Several scholars have identified problems with franchise bidding,
both in the bidding process itself and in the behavior expected of the
winning bidder during the term of the franchise. Analyzing the bid-
ding process itself, one commentator points out that even if bidding
ensures lowest cost production, it still does not guarantee economic
efficiency because product selection and price structure issues must also
94. Kolderie, The Redesign of Public Transit: Changing the "Givens", PUBLIC
SERVICES REDESIGN PROJECT 10 (1983). Pagano, Private Sector Alternatives for Public
Transportation, 38 TRANSP. Q. 404, 413 (1984).
95. Government enterprise is often assumed to be synonymous with monopoly pro-
duction, and privatization is assumed to be the only means to introduce competition
among producers. Thus, advocates of privatization rest their case on the premise that
small, privately-run enterprise provides more choice and is inherently more efficient
than a large monopoly sustained by the taxpayers. G. ROTH & G. WYNNE, LEARNING
FROM ABROAD: FREE ENTERPRISE URBAN TRANSPORTATION vi (1982). This will be
true because monopoly public enterprise: (1) has the ability to inefficiently absorb losses
due to subsidization from tax revenues; (2) is unable to resist political pressures; and
(3) invariably utilizes cross-subsidization, which allows some services to be inefficiently
operated at a loss by operating others at excess profits. Id. at 29, 54-58.
In the Model Act, the government enterprise will cease to be a monopoly supplier
and will become a bidder for contracts along with private enterprises. Because good
management performance in private enterprises can be more directly rewarded moneta-
rily or penalized by shareholder dissatisfaction and lower stock prices, some scholars
believe that private enterprise is inherently more efficient. See N. HAMILTON & P.
HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 68-69; Hamilton, Feldthusen & Crisp, supra note 51, at 1,
22-23; Conybeare, Bureaucracy, Monopoly and Competition, 28 AM. J. POL. ScI. 479,
496 (1984).
A 1983 study of the effect of management on cost concludes that private transit man-
agement is associated with operating costs per hour that are $1.72 less than for publicly
owned systems. Pucher, Markstedt & Hirschman, supra note 5, at 170 (1983). In Aus-
tralia, costs of private urban bus operators are between one-half and two-thirds those of
publicly owned operators providing the same service. Roth, The Overseas Experience,
in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 215. But see R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at
95 (concluding that literature does not support assertions of drmatic efficiency differ-
ences between municipality owned and private electric utilities). This data suggests that
publicly owned transit producers may have difficulties securing contracts with a bidding
system.
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be addressed.96 The Act addressed this problem by requiring the
Transit Board to define scaled mobility objectives. Transit producers
then bid the highest mobility objective they can attain with the subsidy
resources available and expected farebox revenues.97
A second problem in the bidding process occurs when winners of the
original competition have substantial advantages over nonwinners at
contract renewal. 98 While in some industries such as electric utilities
problems exist regarding immobile assets and their valuation if the ex-
isting franchise loses the bid, these problems are not as severe with
mobile assets like buses. The existing franchise does enjoy a certain
advantage both because of better information about actual cost and de-
mand conditions for purposes of bidding and because the existing
franchise does not have a high cost transition period in which its man-
agement must learn firm-specific technical and personnel aspects of the
job.99 The existing franchise's advantage, however, should be small.
The Act provides that data on previous contracts and their perform-
ance shall be made available to potential bidders. Start-up costs in bus
transit appear to be low and minimum optimal scale is small."
A second set of problems identified with franchise bidding concerns
the expected behavior of the winning bidder during the franchise term.
First, the longer the contract, the greater the need for the contract to
have a provision for renegotiation in response to changes in costs, de-
mand, or technology.10 This is an area for experimentation, but given
the mobility of bus transit assets, contracts of three years should be
long enough to permit the recovery of the initial bidding costs, but still
short enough that uncertainty about future conditions is minimized. 10 2
Because wages and salaries comprise roughly seventy to eighty per-
cent of all operating costs, labor relations and labor costs will be the
major area of concern for bidders.' 03 All bidders will face the same
96. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 70-71.
97. The transit producers must define both prices and product selection in their
bids, given the resources available.
98. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 69-70.
99. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 72.
100. See supra discussion at notes 87-92.
101. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 69.
102. The Dallas Transit Authority has a three year contract with Trailways for
regular high volume commuter service in which unanticipated cost increases are taken
out of Trailways' profits. Hayes, supra note 92, at E5, cols. 1-5.
103. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at Ill.
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labor conditions at contract renewal and each must estimate its per-
formance over the contract period, taking into account the probable
outcome of labor negotiations. Problems may arise in the event of a
strike. Transit labor can bring strong public pressure to bear on the
Transit Board through transit stoppage." Given the existence of al-
ternative suppliers, a sensible solution is to give the existing suppliers a
defined time period to resolve the strike, at the end of which the
Transit Board may seek other suppliers.
The second potential problem concerning the winning bidder's be-
havior during the franchise term is the franchisee's tendency to under-
invest in fixed assets or cut back on maintenance or service quality
during a franchise term in order to make more profit and reduce losses
in the event the contract is not reawarded to the existing franchisee.105
The reward and penalty clauses discussed below are designed to allevi-
ate this problem. Falling ridership, as a result of a reduction in quality
of service, will cause the franchisee to fail to meet contractual obliga-
tions and thus trigger penalties.
Because municipalities have had little experience with private suppli-
ers of transit service, the optimal provisions for a private producer con-
tract are a matter for experimentation. The contractor's profit must be
tied to the operating objectives in the simplest possible terms and de-
tailed service considerations must be the province of operating manag-
ers familiar with changing demand and cost conditions. If the transit
producer is committed to achieve a particular level of mobility for pas-
sengers, for example in terms of passenger miles, consumer response
will then dictate success or failure in achieving this mobility. The
means of eliciting favorable consumer response must, therefore, be in
the hands of the producer.
If the contract is complex and has detailed vehicle and performance
standards, only large bus operators will bid to produce the service."'
6
Small producers will find the transaction costs of understanding and
complying with detailed requirements disproportionally high and will
not bid."7 At this early stage in the development of private alterna-
tives, complex contractual requirements will discourage both diversity
of supply and innovation in privately produced transit.
104. Id.
105. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note at 69-70.
106. See Giuliano & Teal, supra note 90, at 162.
107. See Lave, supra note 77, at 16; Johnson & Pkarski, supra note 90, at 62.
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If the Transit Board dictates detailed service characteristics to a con-
tractor, no assurance exists that this is what the consumers want.1°8
The Transit Board's role is to monitor the actual performance as com-
pared to the agreed upon performance objective and to assess penalties
or provide rewards at regular intervals as agreed upon in the
contract. 109
Reward and penalty clauses in the contract must be designed to pro-
vide producers with the incentive to perform correctly. Present transit
management rewards often depend on the number of employees man-
aged and the base wage rate paid to the drivers. Thus, increases in
organizational size or in the salaries of subordinate personnel normally
cause the manager's salary to increase."' An incentive system that
rewards a producer for exceeding a baseline performance and penalizes
it for falling short of agreed performance expectations could correct
such perverse incentives. In the alternative, the contract could specify
an amount that the Transit Board would pay, leaving producers free to
adapt service to the market or to decrease costs so as to increase prof-
its."11 The Transit Board should not be alarmed if producers who
achieve exceptional results realize large performance rewards, because
the production of the significantly greater service will have been
achieved at costs substantially lower than anticipated.11 2
Despite the uncertainty that remains concerning the optimal form of
contract bidding, the Transit Board's efforts in experimentation with
and improvement of the contracting process are focused in the right
direction. Even if perfect bidding parity is not possible among all bid-
ders at contract renewal, the threat of potential competition will keep
costs down. 13 Management of private transit service suppliers will
also have a greater incentive to bargain effectively with transit labor,
and the existence of alternative suppliers will equalize transit labor's
108. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 109-15; Morlok & Viton,
supra note 81, at 251-52. Detailed contracts lead to significant increases in administra-
tive costs to coordinate and to monitor performance, loss of flexibility, and strained
relations with contractors. See Johnson & Pikarski, supra note 90, at 62.
109. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 106.
110. Simpson, Implications of Efficiency Incentives on Use of Private Sector Con-
tracting by the Public Transit Industry, in URBAN TRANSIT, supra note 4, at 299, 300.
111. Schofer, supra note 87, at 156.
112. Simpson, supra note at 305. Incentive contracts are currently utilized in Phoe-
nix and Chicago. Johnson & Pikarski, supra note 90, at 61; Lave, supra note 77, at 27.
113. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 107; Morlok & Viton,
supra note 89, at 240.
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presently enjoyed market power."14
In the transition to a contracting process that will introduce compet-
itive pressures, the Transit Board should consider the potential disrup-
tion to ridership or finances of the current publicly-owned monopoly
producer. This will ease the impact of the transition on transit labor
and the community.
Subd. 5 [MEMBERSHIP]
(a) The Transit Board shall be governed by a Board of Directors
comprised of six members appointed by the Council plus a chair ap-
pointed by the governor. One member must be appointed by the Coun-
cil from each of six Metropolitan Council districts, and each such
member must be a resident of the district for which he is appointed
during his term of appointment.
Each member must have at least a minimum knowledge of the com-
munity, business matters, and transit operations. The minimum skill
level must be met in the following manner:
(i) Directors shall be required to reside one year before and dur-
ing tenure on the Board within the regional transportation area ser-
viced by the public transportation system;
(ii) Directors shall possess, prior to assuming Board responsibili-
ties, a familiarity with the management of complex organizations, and
knowledge of corporate business and finance;
(iii) Directors shall acquire knowledge of transit operations, ac-
complished through a mandatory training program provided by the
Transit Board; and
(iv) Directors may not during their term of office hold any other
office as a regional commissioner or hold a judicial office. Each mem-
ber will take the oath of office as prescribed in the state constitution.
Comment: A multi-member Board of Directors contributes to the
Board's knowledge of community preferences and business matters and
provides a check against arbitrariness and bias."5 The Board should
114. See Schofer, supra note 87, at 156. Managers of government enterprises gener-
ally have no incentive to bargain as hard as private enterprise managers. Shaw & Clark,
The Practical Difference Between Public and Private Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L.
REV. 867, 876 (1972). With the creation of a single transit supplier in most urban areas,
transit workers obtained the power to cripple a city with little risk of losing their jobs.
Johnson & Pikarski, supra note 90, at 74.
115. U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF Gov-
ERNMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS 21 (1949); J. THURSTON, supra note 39, at 150. Besides bringing more input to
the transit operations, having a multi-member staff or larger size has been suggested as a
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not be so large as to diffuse responsibility and accountability. In addi-
tion, the requirement that a member be appointed from each metropol-
itan council district creates a geographical distribution covering the
area that the transit system will serve, which provides a second insur-
ance of fair representation.
The appointment process requires consideration of the background
and qualifications of potential Board members (subdivision 4 § (b)).
To ensure the working competency of the Board, the Act articulates a
minimum skill level that all directors must meet. 1 6 These qualifica-
factor in bringing about the additional advantage of lower utility rates. See Smiley &
Greene, Determinants of the Effectiveness of Utility Regulation 21-22 (June 1981) (un-
published manuscript). The Illinois and Minnesota Legislatures have followed the
multi-member approach in establishing their regional boards of directors. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 703.01 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 473.373(2)
(1984). But see Address by B.J. Cudahy, Mass Transit in American Cities (Feb. 17,
1981). Discussing the weakness of a board organizational structure, Cudahy states:
In its best manifestation, the board of directors provides general policy guidance to
a professional staff who have been hired to conduct day-to-day operations. All too
often, however, the board of directors concept falls prey to a variety of human
failings and becomes a stumbling block to the achievement of any kind of ordinary
progress.
Id. at 14.
116. In many cases, members of existing transit boards have limited knowledge of
business management generally or transit management in particular. Horn, supra note
58, at 30; Barvick, The Effect of Commission Structure on Decision Making-Part I, 112
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 15 (Nov. 10, 1983) (discussing the same deficiency with respect to
utility commissioners). This increases the possibility of error. Bernstein urges that
"regulatory success hinges more on the quality of the individual commissioners than
any other single factor." M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 103 (1955). The question is what qualities should be utilized for board
membership?
In order to undertake the task of defining policies that reflect the preference of the
community, Board members must have at least minimum knowledge of the community
by residing in it. The task of translating these policies into operating objectives and
performance criteria also requires a capacity for independent counsel in business mat-
ters, and a basic knowledge of transit operations. With respect to knowledge of business
matters, Soloman observes that a director should possess a familiarity with the manage-
ment of complex organizations and knowledge of corporate business and finance.
Soloman, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise,
76 MIcH. L. REV. 581, 603 (1978); See also Barvick, supra, at 18.
Recognizing these needs, the enabling act for the Chicago Transit Authority has a
requirement that board members shall be persons of recognized business ability. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 319 (1970), and Minnesota requires all members of its Me-
troplitan Transit Commission to have management experience. MINN. STAT.
§ 473.404(5) (1984). Few statutory mandates, however, show such foresight. Because
few members of existing boards have knowledge about transit before their appointment,
Board members should receive mandatory training on transit operations. Horn, supra
note 58, at 20, 29.
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tion requirements will increase the Board's efficiency and minimize its
errors. Qualifications include familiarity with the management of com-
plex organizations, knowledge of corporate business and finance, and
the willingness and time to acquire knowledge concerning transit
operations. 117
Another factor to consider during the nomination and appointment
of Board members is the importance of minimizing conflicts of inter-
est.' 8 To ensure that possible conflicts of interest are examined, this
provision prohibits members from holding commissionerships or judi-
cial office. Other provisions could be added to further guard against
conflicts of interest, including prohibiting members from holding elec-
tive office, being employed by federal, state, county or municipal gov-
ernment, or having a financial interest in any business of the transit
authority.
The Council appointment of Transit Board members, who are ex-
pected to be responsive to the Council, should encourage the Board's
sensitivity to the regional community served by the transportation sys-
tem. To provide a strong link to state government and broaden state
117. Individuals experienced in business and knowledgeable about the community
can absorb information much faster than those without experience. Pelosci has com-
mented on the potential benefits of improving the educational level of board members:
"Not the least of these will be the relative facility and speed with which well-educated
appointees can pass through unproductive instruction periods. Staff domination of the
commission proceedings will also be increasingly less likely." Pelosci, The Energy Crisis
and the New Breed of Regulators: A Study of State Public Utility Commissions, 13 MID-
WEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 51 (1980).
Board membership should not be an occasion for remedial work in business knowl-
edge or community preferences. Another potential benefit is that members with exten-
sive business backgrounds seem to be more effective in keeping rates down. T. Pelosei,
The Energy Crisis and the New Breed of Regulators: A Study of State Public Utility
Commissions 27 (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
The trend clearly seems to be in the direction of seeking commissioners with general
business backgrounds. Pelosci, supra, at 52; Samprone & Riddell-Dudra, State Regula-
tory Climate: Can It Be Predicted?, 108 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 41, 42 (Oct. 8, 1981); Smith,
Regulatory Commissions in 1984-Are the Dice Loaded?, 113 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 15, 19
(May 10, 1984).
118. See J. THURSTON, supra note 39, at 159. In order to maintain board auton-
omy, Ohio has prohibited elected officials from serving as board members. 1973 Op.
Att'y Gen. 73-016; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111A, 703.01 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985) (a board member cannot be a member or an employee of another public body);
MINN. STAT. § 473.404(5) (1984) (prohibiting MTC members from being a member of
the Metropolitan Council, other metro commissions, boards, or agencies, or from hold-
ing judicial office).
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concerns regarding transportation and its financing, the governor ap-
points the chairperson.
(b) The Council shall establish a Transit Board Appointments
Committee composed of community leaders from the area served by
the Transit Board. The Appointments Committee is responsible for
screening potential directors' qualifications and competence.
The Appointments Committee shall notify in writing the governing
body of the statutory and home rule charter cities, towns, and counties
having territory in the district for which the director is to be appointed.
The notification must describe the appointment process and invite par-
ticipation and recommendations on the appointment. The Appoint-
ments Committee shall hold a public hearing in each district for which
a member is to be appointed. Following the hearing, the Appointments
Committee shall submit to the Council a written report that includes
both a list of persons who have applied or have been nominated or
recommended for the position, along with a description of the back-
ground and qualifications of each, and the recommendation of the Ap-
pointments Committee concerning the appointment.
The Appointments Committee shall also compile a list of nominees
for the position of chair for submission to the governor. The Council
shall, by resolution after a public hearing on the subject, provide the
governor with a list of nominees.
Comment: The Appointments Committee, as a separate entity from
the Council, aids in monitoring the qualifications of Transit Board ap-
pointees, assists in achieving a long-run balance in representation, and
serves as an additional check on the integrity of the appointment pro-
cess." 9 The appointment of Transit Board members based on the
nominee's qualifications is more likely to satisfy the competency re-
quirements for directors than would an election. 120 Thus, accountabil-
119. The Ohio legislature adopted a similar appointment process with its creation of
a Public Utilities Commission Nominating Council. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4901.021 (Page Supp. 1984). This method is also analogous to merit-selection com-
mittees proposed for judicial appointments. See Heggs, Merit Selection for the Ohio
Judiciary: An Analysis of S.J.R. 6, and a Proposal for Implementation, 28 CASE W. RES.
628, 638 (1978). See also supra note 60 for a discussion of Citizen's Advisory Commit-
tees. For a skeptical view of whether any promise exists in such mechanisms to improve
personnel, see S. BREYER, supra note 16, at 343.
120. The question whether the transit corporation board should be elected or ap-
pointed is an extremely difficult one and has no certain answer. Good arguments exist
on both sides of the question.
The populist preference for direct election of public officials, including judges and
regulatory commissioners, is based on the inevitability of political influence in any ap-
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ity of the Transit Board is best achieved through an appointment
process rather than through direct election.
pointment process. The argument is that the very fact that some political authority has
to make the selection permanently injects politics into the matter. The shift from an
elective process to an appointive one, therefore, results in transferring the matter from
an overtly political arena to one in which politicking is more "clubby" than it should be
because it is less visible to the public. The elective process, as poor as it might be, is
then always to be preferred to an indirect method of selection that is not necessarily
representative of the people who have to abide by the governmental decisions. See
Heggs, supra note 119, at 638; Smiley & Greene, supra note 115, at 19.
The assumption that the elective process leads to selection of officials representative
of the people is questionable. Indeed, the political nature of elected officials is more
often challenged as producing special problems very likely to influence negatively the
regulatory climate of state commissions. See Ferguson, Depreciation Issues of the Eight-
ies: It's Back to Basics, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 30, 32 (Dec. 9, 1982); R. SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 10, at 16, 62; Samprone & Riddell-Dudra, supra note 117, at 42. The electo-
rate does not have sufficient knowledge of planning and production function problems
to have a clear notion of Transit Board competence. See Heggs, supra note 119, at 644;
T. Pelosci, supra note 117, at 14, 23. Unless glaring inadequacies are manifest, the
community will probably have little knowledge of Transit Board performance. The
value of incumbency at the time of reelection also suggests that elected boards are not
answerable to the people. Id. at 645; see also Pelosci, supra note 117, at 54.
Even if direct election yields Transit Board members more responsive to the commu-
nity, elected Transit Board members may not possess the capacity to give independent
counsel on business matters. This lack of expertise may inhibit the Transit Board from
both implementing its policy-making role and monitoring transit providers. Failure to
translate general policy into operating objectives or failure to monitor transit producer
performance will prevent the realization of the lowest cost production of services. This
will decrease the community welfare, which the Transit Board is directed to maximize.
For example, in a survey of elected and appointed public utility commissions in the
United States, Pelosci found clear evidence that rates were substantially higher under
elected commissioners than under appointed ones. T. Pelosci, supra note 117, at 22.
Schmalensee also found evidence that regulatory performance is better with an ap-
pointed commission than with an elected one. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 62.
Other authorities disagree. Research by Smiley and Greene, based on 1970 data, con-
sidered among other factors residential prices charged by the utilities and inferred that
utilities regulated by elected commissions achieved more favorable results in that area
than those regulated by appointed officials. Smiley & Greene, supra note 115, at 19-24.
Mann and Primeaux, using data from 1979, produced evidence that the election of com-
missioners correlated with lower electricity rates. Mann & Primeaux, The Controversial
Question of Commissioner Selection, 111 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 23-24 (Mar. 17, 1983). The
latter study concluded, however, that the choice between election and appointment can-
not be made on that basis alone. Id. at 24.
The most recent studies and literature propose that the manner in which commission-
ers are selected has no significant impact on the rates consumers pay. Costello, per-
forming a regression analysis using 1980 data, concluded that "contrary to what one
might expect, elected commissions do not favor residential customers any more than
appointed commissions do." Costello, Electing Regulators: The Case of Public Utility
Commissions, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 83, 88 (1984). The article indicated that lower rates
under elected officials may be attributable to the fact that states with elected commis-
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(c) Directors shall serve in office for terms of three years, except
for the initial terms as provided. One third of the Transit Board shall
be initially appointed for a term length of one year, one third shall be
initially appointed for a term length of two years, and one third shall be
initially appointed for a term length of three years. Directors may be
reappointed for additional terms. A director may not, however, serve
more than two consecutive full terms.
Comment: Staggered initial appointments of Transit Board direc-
tors prevents the terms from expiring at the same time.12 Although
simultaneous expirations and appointments would reduce the amount
of time spent on the appointment process and would simplify the train-
ing program, the operation of the Transit Board would be disrupted.
In addition, no experienced, active directors would be on hand to aid
the inexperienced members.
The term for service on the Transit Board is set at three years, be-
cause long tenure on a board can lead to inertia. More frequent turno-
ver contributes to greater openness to innovative proposals and
increased sensitivity to the social dimensions of transit policy.12z Also,
sions, on average, are more favorably situated with regard to fuel costs, distribution
costs, and taxes. Id. at 99. Harris and Navarro concur. Using 1980 statistical data,
they found that "while there may appear to be a superficial correlation between lower
rates and the election of utility commissioners, statistically the observed phenomenon
cannot be attributed to the method of selecting commissioners." Harris & Navarro,
Does Electing Public Utility Commissions Bring Lower Electric Rates?, 112 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 23 (Sept. 1, 1983). See also NEWSBEAT: REGULATION, ELECTRICAL WORLD 13
(1984).
Given the ambiguity in the current evidence, it seems intuitively preferable to create a
mechanism to ensure that the factor of competence is incorporated into the choice of
board members. Appointment to the Transit Board by elected local officials or the
Metropolitan Council on the basis of qualifications has a higher likelihood of satisfying
the Model Act's condition that a Transit Board be competent, and "may be a reasonable
compromise toward obtaining qualified commissioners and at the same time allowing
the public to participate in the selection by broad representation on the panel." Mann
& Primeaux, supra, 24. For examples of transit acts that currently provide for the ap-
pointment of board members, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 11 703.01, 703A.02
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. §§ 473.373(2), 473.404(2) (1984).
121. See MINN. STAT. §§ 473.373(4), 473.404(3) (1984).
122. Shorter tenure is considered desirable for public officials because "more is lost
by long continuance of [individuals] in office than is generally to be gained by their
experience." F. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 62 (1968). See
Pelosci, supra note 117, at 55; Roberts, supra note 10, at 424. The rationale for such a
conclusion is that longer terms of office tend to isolate commissioners from public pres-
sure and thus make them less responsive to community needs. Smiley & Greene, supra
note 115, at 22; Hagerman & Ratchford, Some Determinants ofAllowed Rates of Return
on Equity to Electric Utilities, 19 BELL J. ECON. 46, 53 (1978).
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consecutive terms of service are limited to ensure regular turnover.
This is particularly useful because appointing authorities rarely use
their power of dismissal and Transit Board members are usually reap-
pointed at the expiration of a term if they wish to continue service.
1 23
(d) Each director shall receive a fixed annual salary, which the
Metropolitan Council shall establish from time to time. In addition,
directors shall be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in the
performance of their duties. Directors may not be the recipients of
gifts, rewards, or perquisites.
Comment: Transit Board salaries must be sufficient to attract quali-
fied candidates and encourage responsible performance.124 An ade-
quate Transit Board salary will increase a director's willingness to
spend the necessary time on Transit Board related activities. Compen-
sation must be high enough so that directors will not be making diffi-
cult trade-off decisions regarding income-producing employment and
Transit Board responsibilities.
Directors should be compensated on a salary basis rather than on a
"per meeting" basis. Because director utility is not a function of the
number of meetings attended, "per meeting" compensation would con-
fuse attendance of meetings with productivity and result in unneces-
sary and unproductive meetings.
125
(e) The duties of the chair are:
(i) to preside over all Transit Board meetings at which the
chairperson is in attendance;
(ii) to serve as the principal transit spokesperson within the met-
ropolitan area before the legislature, other state and regional agencies,
local units of government, and the general public;
(iii) to present to the governor and the legislature, after approval
by the Council, the Transit Board's financial plan for public transit in
the metropolitan area; and
123. Horn, supra note 58, at 68; Garner, Public Corporations in the United King-
dom, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 28, at 14.
124. Pelosci concluded that low inducement levels in terms of salary and staff size
inhibits the entry of well-educated individuals onto utility commissions. Pelosci, Energy
Crisis, supra note 117, at 57; See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 1/, 703.04, 704A.09
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (granting a $25,000 per year salary for RTA directors but no
compensation for Service Board members); MINN. STAT. § 473.404(7) (1984) (establish-
ing compensation for members of the Metropolitan Transit Commission). S. BREYER,
supra note 16, at 343-44; Smith, supra note 117, at 19. Smiley & Greene, supra note
115, at 19, 22.
125. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 117-18.
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(iv) to perform other duties assigned by law or by the Transit
Board.
Comment: The governor's appointment of the chairperson should
lend prestige and credibility to that position. These powers are in-
tended to assist the chairperson in providing direction and leadership
to the Transit Board.
(f) Transit Board members may resign or be removed under the
following conditions:
(i) Any director may resign from his office, to take effect when his
successor is appointed.
(ii) The Council may remove any director it has appointed at will.
The governor may remove the chairperson at will.
(iii) Every office shall become vacant before the expiration of the
term of such office on the happening of the following events.
(a) Death of the incumbent;
(b) Resignation;
(c) Removal;
(d) Ceasing to be an inhabitant of the district for which that direc-
tor was appointed;
(e) Conviction of any infamous crime, or of any offense involving a
violation of his official oath;
(f) Refusal or neglect to take the oath of office, or to give or renew
his official bond, or to deposit or file such oath or bond within the time
prescribed;
(g) The decision of a competent tribunal declaring his election or
appointment void; or
(h) Death of the person appointed to fill a vacancy, or to serve a
full term, before he qualifies, or before the time when by law he should
enter upon the duties of the office to which he was appointed, in which
case the vacancy shall be deemed to take place at the time when his
term of office would have begun.
Comment: The ability of superiors to impose sanctions on a director
is an important check on the accountability of an appointed board.
Critics charge that appointed boards are insulated from public opinion
and are unresponsive to the community. 26 Granting the appointing
126. See A. WALSH, supra note 10, at 6. Walsh states:
Public authorities that are supposed to act in the general interest of a state, region,
or city frequently do not. Because of their insulation, they overemphasize financial
returns and reflect or accept the viewpoints of banking and business participants.
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authorities the power to remove directors at will alleviates this
tendency. '2 7
Subd. 6. [ORGANIZATION OF THE BOARD]
(a) As soon as possible after the appointment of the initial direc-
tors, the Transit Board shall organize for the transaction of business,
including the formation of committees, and adopt bylaws, rules, and
regulations to govern its proceedings.
(b) The Transit Board shall appoint a secretary and treasurer, who
need not be members of the Transit Board, to hold office at the plea-
sure of the Transit Board. Before entering upon the duties of their
respective offices, they shall take and subscribe an official oath.
Comment: A committee structure can further develop specialized
Board expertise. Committees are often a more efficient method of op-
eration than full Transit Board participation. If expertise is developed
and issues are consolidated prior to presentation before the full Transit
Board, time is more effectively allocated among the various
committees. 
128
The committee types may include the following:
(i) The audit committee, which is primarily responsible for finan-
cial accountability;
(ii) The management committee, which is responsible for formu-
lating a policy statement, operating objectives, and performance crite-
They bias government investment in favor of physical infrastructures for short-
term economic return.
Id.
127. The Illinois Transit Act provides for removal of RTA directors and Service
Board members upon a "formal finding of incompetence, neglect of duty or malfea-
sance." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 703.03, 703A.03 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
The Minnesota act allows for the removal of MTC members "for cause." MINN. STAT.
§ 473.404(6) (1984).
128. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) favors the establishment of a
strong committee system as one method of strengthening the independence of private
corporation boards and enabling the boards to better serve corporations in an oversight
capacity. Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rules Relating to Share-
holder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally 293, 297 (proposed July 18, 1978). In addition,
parallels can be seen in private businesses in which top management often delegate deci-
sion-making authority to profit centers to minimize transaction costs. R. SCHMALEN-
SEE, supra note 10, at 15. The need for a specialized staff also exists under public
ownership because of collective choice problems and the requirement of expertise. Id.
at 49, 54. Ultimately, decision-making power is efficiently located where the best infor-
mation is found. Spence, The Economics of Internal Organization: An Introduction, 6
BELL J. EcON. 163, 165-66 (1975).
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ria, and for reviewing and selecting transit providers with whom the
Transit Board shall contract;
(iii) The performance measurement committee, which shall moni-
tor management performance with respect to the criteria established by
the Transit Board to ensure efficiency; and
(iv) The capital projects committee, which shall undertake capital
planning and monitor capital projects."2 9
Any issue or group of issues resolved by a committee shall be
presented to the full Transit Board for final discussion and approval.
Subd. 7. [CONDUCT OF BOARD MEETINGS]
(a) Regular meetings of the Transit Board will be held at least once
in each calendar month, at a time and place fixed by the Transit Board.
(b) A majority of the Transit Board constitutes a quorum for the
transaction of business. The Transit Board has the power to act by
majority vote of directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is in
attendance. All action by the Transit Board will be by ordinance or
resolution.
(c) All ordinances, resolutions, meetings, and proceedings of the
Transit Board and all documents and records in its possession are pub-
lic records and open to public inspection or attendance, except such
meetings and proceedings and such documents and records as are kept
or prepared by the Transit Board pertaining to negotiations, actions, or
proceedings to which the Transit Board is a party. Notice of special
meetings shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation pub-
lished in the regional transportation area not less than ten days prior to
the meeting.
Comment: Providing information to the public facilitates both an
accurate response to community preferences and achievement of the
lowest-cost provision of service. On one hand, the community must be
informed before it can effectively monitor policymakers. 13 ° The com-
munity relies primarily on the media for information concerning poli-
cies adopted and the level of production efficiency attained.' 3' The
129. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 116-17; T. Pelosci, supra
note 117, at 13.
130. R.L. Banks & Assocs., supra note 36, at 27. The Illinois Transit Act specifi-
cally provides for hearings to encourage participation in the development and service of
public transportation policy. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111A, f 705.01 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
131. UNTAA, supra note 10, at 57. Robson maintains that concern by the press is
the first safeguard against maladies that may afflict public undertakings. W. ROBSON,
supra note 73, at 452.
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media must have a guaranteed access to information before it can fulfill
this rule. In addition, open meetings will encourage directors to attend
board meetings.
On the other hand, the openness of decision-making should be lim-
ited in some instances. Meetings and proceedings, documents and
records relating to negotiations, and actions or proceedings to which
the Transit Board is a party may be too sensitive for public view.
When this is the case, informal exchange and debate may be inhibited,
disputes may be resolved inefficiently, and certain private interests may
be allowed to benefit at the public's expense. In addition, heavy reli-
ance upon the media to inform the community on these issues may
create distortions and biases affecting the outcome of the negotiation or
action. 13
2
(d) A Transit Board member is required to attend all committee,
special and Transit Board meetings. Attendance falling below eighty
percent is cause for removal.
Comment: Minimum attendance levels are justifiable because the
level of performance expected of a compensated board is substantially
higher than that of a noncompensated board. This provides an incen-
tive to directors to maintain their competence and fulfill their duties.133
Subd. 8. [BUDGET; REGIONAL TRANSIT BOARD]
(a) The Transit Board shall prepare, submit for review, adopt, and
implement budgets annually.
At least thirty days prior to the beginning of the first full fiscal year
after creation of the authority, and annually thereafter, the Transit
Board shall cause to be prepared a tentative budget that shall include
all revenues and expenses for the ensuing fiscal year. The Transit
Board shall consider a tentative budget at a public meeting, after notice
published in a newspaper of general circulation published in the re-
gional transportation area not less than ten days prior to the meeting.
No expenditures in excess of the budget shall be made during any year
except by the affirmance of a majority of the full Transit Board.
132. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 129; Recchie & Chernoski,
Government in the Sunshine: Open Meeting Legislation in Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 497,
508 (1976). See also Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53
N.C.L. REV. 451, 475 (1975); Note, The Iowa Open Meeting Act: A Lesson in Legisla-
tive Ineffectiveness, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1008, 1125, 1128 (1977); Note, What Constitutes a
"Meeting" Under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law?, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 251
(1985).
133. Horn found three transit authorities that have attendance requirements. Horn,
supra note 58, at 61.
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Along with its annual budget, each year the Transit Board shall pre-
pare a financial plan for the succeeding three calendar years. The fi-
nancial plan must be consistent with the Transit Board's
implementation plan. The financial plan prepared in even-numbered
years must contain a proposed request for state financial assistance for
the succeeding biennium. The Transit Board shall submit the financial
plan to the Council for review and approval or disapproval. The Coun-
cil may approve or disapprove the plan in whole or in part. The Coun-
cil may disapprove the plan only for inconsistency with the policy of
the Council.
Comment: The budget process should not define system policy.
Rather, the policy plan and implementation plan should guide the
budget.'3 4 Defining policy through the budget process obfuscates the
actual policies being pursued and eventually inhibits outside evaluation
by voters or appointing authorities. Also, the budget process tends to
be accretionary and does not take a comprehensive view of the system's
mission and the final impact desired.135 In practice, transit manage-
ment develops the budget in many systems with the Transit Board
making few changes after the budget is presented for approval. 36 The
result of this process is that producers ultimately create transit policies
rather than the Board.
Subd. 9. [LOCAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PRO-
GRAM] In preparing and amending its implementation plan pursuant
to subdivision 3, the Transit Board shall establish a program to ensure
134. When the board fails to articulate policy to guide management, or if general
policy is relatively undeveloped, it is the budget that allocates the resources available
and implicitly sets policy in many transit systems. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON,
supra note 8, at 25-26.
135. The balancing and planning necessary for maximizing the change in welfare
are absent. Due and Friedlaender point out that existing programs are not reviewed in
detail in the preparation of a budget: "The presumption is that existing activities will
continue unless there is strong evidence that their existence should be reconsidered." J.
DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 19, at 133. "There should be comparison of the
relative merits of various requests. The traditional presentation of material in a budget
does not facilitate this task." Id. at 138.
136. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 26. Even the data provided
for purposes of monitoring the budget and evaluation of management performance are
basically a product of management initiative in many systems. Horn, supra note 58, at
68; but see Schlickman, supra note 56, at 2 (when "service boards" would have the
authority to determine fare and service levels subject to the "bottom line" budget review
of the Illinois RTA); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 1112/3, 704.11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. § 473.435 (1984) (giving the operations division (MTC) the power to for-
mulate a budget subject to final approval by the planning division (RTB)).
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participation by representatives of local government units and local
government coordination of transit planning and development. The
Transit Board shall encourage the establishment of local transit plan-
ning and development boards by local governments for the purpose of:
(a) assisting and advising the Transit Board in preparing the imple-
mentation plan, including the identification of service needs and
objectives;
(b) preparing, or advising and assisting local units of government
in preparing the transit study and service plan required herein; and
(c) preparing or advising the Transit Board in the review of appli-
cations for assistance as provided herein.
The Transit Board may provide local boards with whatever assist-
ance it deems necessary and appropriate.
Comment: This provision promotes local involvement in planning
and development by encouraging the participation of local govern-
ments. The local boards can serve as advisory committees and study
groups for the Transit Board and as a check on the quality of transit
services being provided.' 37
Subd. 10. [SPECIAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE]
(a) [PROJECT OBJECTIVES] The Transit Board shall imple-
ment a project to coordinate special transportation service in the met-
ropolitan area. The project has the following objectives:
(i) to provide greater access to transportation for the elderly,
handicapped, and others in the metropolitan area with special trans-
portation needs;
(ii) to develop an integrated system of special transportation ser-
vice providing transportation tailored to meet special individual needs
in the most cost-efficient manner; and
(iii) to supplement rather than replace existing public and private
providers of service wherever possible and to increase the productivity
of all special transportation vehicles available in the area.
(b) [FINANCING; IMPLEMENTATION; MANAGEMENT
AND ADVISORY GROUPS] The Transit Board shall contract for
137. For an article discussing the value and importance of governing board member
exchanges of information and fostering positive relations with other arms of local gov-
ernment, see Tarbett, Effective Governing Boards, 42 PuB. POWER 26 (May-June 1984).
Both the Illinois and Minnesota enabling acts instruct their regional planning boards to
establish programs ensuring the participation of local government units and coordina-
tion of planning and development. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 1-/, 702.12 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 473.382 (1984). See also discussion at note 60 supra.
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services necessary for the project's operation through the same steps
outlined in subdivision 4 of this section. The Transit Board shall estab-
lish a special transportation service committee to set policies, operating
objectives, and performance criteria for the project. The committee
must include the chairperson of the Transit Board or the chairperson's
designee, representatives of persons contracting to produce services for
the project, representatives of users of the service, and representatives
of appropriate agencies. The meetings of the committee shall be public
and minutes of all meetings must be taken, preserved, and made avail-
able for public inspection. The Transit Board shall establish an advi-
sory task force of individuals representing the elderly, handicapped,
and other users of service provided by the project to advise the
committee.
(c) [DUTIES OF BOARD] In implementing the project the
Transit Board shall:
(i) encourage participation in the project by public and private
producers of special transportation service;
(ii) encourage individuals using service provided through the pro-
ject to use the type of service most appropriate to their particular
needs;
(iii) encourage shared rides to the greatest extent practicable;
(iv) encourage public agencies that provide transportation to eligi-
ble individuals as a component of human services and educational pro-
grams to coordinate with the project and to allow reimbursement for
services provided through the project at rates that reflect the public
cost of providing those services; and
(v) establish criteria to be used in determining individual eligibil-
ity for special transportation services.
(d) [COORDINATION REQUIRED] The Transit Board may not
grant financial assistance to any recipient that proposes to use any part
of the grant to provide special transportation service in the metropoli-
tan area unless the program is coordinated with the project in the man-
ner determined by the Transit Board.
(e) [ACCESS FOR SPECIAL TRANSPORTATION SERV-
ICES] Special transportation projects receiving assistance by contract
with the Transit Board shall be subject to the following provisions:
(i) a person operating or assisting the operation of a vehicle while
employed by a program providing transportation to those with special
transportation needs may leave the vehicle to enter premises in order to
assist a person who does not require emergency ambulance service to
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gain access and entrance to the vehicle. The assistance shall include
assisting through the first entrance to a building. Operators of the spe-
cial transportation vehicles shall provide the necessary passenger assist-
ance for door-through-door service.
(ii) Assistance shall also include assisting wheelchair passengers
over any exterior steps essential to either departure or destination
buildings, subject to both the steps and the wheelchair being in good
repair.
(iii) If an operator or assistant refuses to assist wheelchair passen-
gers because of the condition of the steps or the wheelchair, the opera-
tor of the service shall send letters to the commissioner of
transportation and the person denied service detailing the corrective
measures necessary to qualify for service.
Comment: A group of citizens cannot use fixed route transit services
because they have special transportation needs. This subdivision re-
quires the Transit Board to accommodate these needs through a special
transportation service.
138
Section 5. [METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION]
Subd. 1. [ESTABLISHMENT] There is created a Metropolitan
Transit Commission as a public corporation and political subdivision
of the State.
Subd. 2. [POWERS]
(a) The Commission has the powers and duties imposed by law;
(b) The Commission may sue and be sued;
(c) The Commission may enter into contracts necessary to carry
out its responsibilities;
(d) The Commission may acquire property necessary for the ac-
complishment of its purposes by purchase, lease, gift, grant, or con-
demnation proceedings, and may sell or otherwise dispose of property
that it no longer requires.
(e) The Commission may make and adopt all rules and regulations
and bylaws as may be necessary or desirable to enable it to execute the
powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed upon it by the
provisions of this statute.
(f) The Commission may engineer, construct, equip, and operate
transit and paratransit systems, projects, or any parts thereof, includ-
ing road lanes or rights of way, terminal facilities, maintenance and
138. See MINN. STAT. § 174.29 (1984) for an example of providing for special trans-
portation needs of the elderly, handicapped, or disabled individuals.
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garage facilities, ramps, parking areas, and any other facilities useful
for or related to any public transit or paratransit system or project.
(g) The Commission may acquire all or any part of an existing
transportation system within the metropolitan area, and may lease any
municipal- or privately-owned facilities for operation and maintenance
by the Commission. The Commission may acquire, construct, im-
prove, own, maintain, and operate any system or part thereof, exercis-
ing when necessary the power to acquire licenses, franchises, rights,
interests, engineering and technical studies, data, or reports owned or
held by any person and determined to be necessary, convenient, or use-
ful to the commission in connection with the acquisition, construction,
improvement, ownership, maintenance, or operation of any system.
(h) The Commission shall prepare the transit plans and service
plans required by the Transit Board for submission to the Transit
Board for approval.
(i) The Commission may apply for and accept gifts, grants, or
loans of money or other property from the United States, the State, or
any person or entity for any of its purposes. The Commission may
enter into any agreement required in connection therewith, may com-
ply with any federal or state laws or regulations applicable thereto, and
may hold, use, and dispose of the money or property in accordance
with the terms of the gift, grant, loan, or agreement.
(j) The Commission may provide for self-insurance or otherwise
provide for insurance relating to any of its property, rights, or revenue,
workers' compensation, public liability, or any other risk or hazard
arising from its activities, and may provide for the insurance of the
commissioners, officers, or employees against the risks or hazards at
the expense of the Commission. If the Commission provides for self-
insurance against its liability and the liability of commissioners, of-
ficers, employees, and agents for damages resulting from the Commis-
sion's torts and those of commissioners, officers, employees, and
agents, including its obligation to pay basic economic loss benefits, it
shall be entitled to deduct from damages and basic economic loss bene-
fits all money paid or payable to the persons seeking damages and ben-
efits from all governmental entities providing medical, hospital, and
disability benefits.
(k) The Commission may enter in a reasonable manner upon any
lands, waters, or premises for the purpose of making any reasonably
necessary or proper surveys, soundings, drillings, and examinations.
The entry may not be deemed a trespass, except that the Commission is
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liable for any actual and consequential loss, injury, or damage
therefrom.
(1) The Commission may appoint such officers and employees as it
may require for the performance of its duties, and fix and determine
their qualifications, duties, and compensation. The Commission may
retain or employ counsel, auditors, engineers, and private consultants
on a contract basis or otherwise for rendering professional or technical
services and advice.
(m) The Commission may require any officer, employee, or con-
tract management firm to obtain and file an individual bond or fidelity
insurance policy.
(n) The Commission may, in lieu of directly managing any public
transit system, or any part thereof, enter into contracts for manage-
ment services. The contracts may provide for compensation, incentive
fees or penalties, the employment of personnel, the services provided,
and other terms and conditions that the Commission deems proper.
The Commission shall advertise for bids and select contractors for
management services through competitive bidding. The terms of the
contract may not be longer than three years. The contract must in-
clude clear operating objectives, stating the service policies of the Com-
mission in terms of the movement of various passenger groups, and
performance criteria, by means of which success in achieving the oper-
ating objectives can be measured. Employees of a contract manager
may serve only in operations.
Comment: Clear objectives and performance criteria, producer au-
tonomy over operational decisions, and bidding for service contracts
under section 4, subdivision 4 of the Act may not in themselves be
sufficient to ensure lowest cost production. In many cases, no bidder
may exist other than the existing government-owned transit authority
that historically has had a transit monopoly. This may be particularly
true in the initial years after enactment of this legislation because new
entrants may appear slowly.
Government enterprises operating monopoly franchises are not sub-
ject to competitive pressures to minimize costs. Without such pres-
sures, these firms can waste resources through managerial slack and
inertia, which includes incurring costs in excess of those that a compet-
itive firm would demonstrate and also dampening incentives for inven-
tion and innovation. The third necessary element for efficiency is the
existence of competitive pressures on management to achieve the objec-
tives at lowest cost.
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Competitive pressures will be introduced into the transit system if
contract management firms are allowed to bid for the opportunity to
manage the publicly-owned monopoly provider.'3 9 Bidding for recur-
139. Given the predominance of public ownership by monopoly in the transit indus-
try, rivalry-type competition could be effectuated in two ways: (1) compare perform-
ance among systems to introduce intercity competition; or (2) allow management firms
the opportunity to manage the publicly-owned provider. The latter is not possible with
government enterprises that directly employ management or with a public purchase and
leaseback to a private firm. A contract management scheme, however, is amenable to
management competition.
Consider first the possibility of creating competitive pressures by comparing manage-
ment performance among transit systems. The principal obstacles to making such com-
parisons is that transit monopolies do not sell in the same geographic market and
consequently do not face the same conditions of demand and cost. The cost differences,
therefore, may not be attributable to managerial competence. Posner, Natural Monop-
oly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 628-29 (1969). An attempt must be made
to factor out the influence of these differences in conditions. In addition, the relation-
ship of costs to policies cannot be ignored. Some types of service, for example, service
to the transportation disadvantaged, may be more costly than other types. Transit costs
are thus, in part, a function of both operating objectives and a very large number of
factors other than managerial competence. These include population density; road;
traffic; and parking conditions; demographic characteristics; the character of the labor
force, climate; and topography. PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY, INC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSIT PERFORMANCE, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 39
(1978).
Regression analyses can possibly be refined to accommodate all these differences in
objectives and other influences on costs. Regression analysis is not, however, a practical
means of introducing competitive pressure for transit management for several reasons.
The skills needed to carry out complex regression analyses of this type are in short
supply. It would be better not to do it at all than to do it badly. Even if the technical
skill were available, the cumulative cost of the initial analyses and subsequent updates
would be very high. Management would dispute the methodology, raising the costs.
Most important, however, is that institutional limits exist regarding what policymak-
ers can understand and implement. As Posner points out, "[a]nyone who believes that a
fruitful direction for forward movement in regulation is toward increasing the amount
of data and the sophistication of the conceptual apparatus used in arriving at regulatory
judgments is ignoring the lesson of experience." Posner, supra, at 629. Posner's conclu-
sion finds support in that state public service commissions are generally not using the
regression models developed for electric utilities by several economists. See N. HAMIL-
TON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 104.
This leaves the possibility that competitive pressures could be introduced by having
contract management firms bid for the opportunity to manage the transit system. See
M. Pikarski & C. Johnson, supra note 1, at 26-27. Some public transit agencies have
successfully embraced the concept of cost savings through private contracting.
"Although these transit agencies have encountered some implementation problems, as
with any innovation, they have achieved very substantial cost savings." Lave, supra
note 77, at 14. For examples of successful utilization, see id. at 18-20; MINN. STAT.
§ 473.405(12) (1984).
Lave points out, however, that contracting faces many difficulties: few suppliers may
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rent short-term management contracts is attractive for a number of
reasons. First, the Commission cannot judge how challenging the
objectives and criteria will be to accomplish without several proposals
to review. A competitive approach will determine the highest level of
performance that can be attained with the available revenue. Second,
even if perfect bidding parity at contract renewal is not reached, the
existing management firm is subject to survival threats that will spur
performance and efficiency. 14° Third, keeping terms short, to two or
three years, has advantages. Under conditions of uncertainty, future
policy objectives, available subsidies, costs, and consumer demand can-
not be satisfactorily specified in longer-term contracts.1
4 1
A contract management approach to lowest cost production is con-
siderably more simple and more effective for the Transit Commission
exist; the bidders may need guidance in working with an administrative agency; and the
agency may have to make a small investment in the private transit infrastructure. Id. at
16, 17. Schmalensee agrees that bidding for management contracts is not an approach
that can be recommended without careful study of the situation. R. SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 10, at 81. Additional problems include: (1) A contractor's pursuit of his
own gain will need to be carefully controlled and the government agency will need to
probe and understand the details of the enterprises' operations. Id. at 77; (2) Because
contractors are only indirectly responsible to equity suppliers, the pressure against
wasteful behavior may be weak. Id. at 78; (3) Because performance depends on deci-
sions by both the public officials and operating management, close coordination is essen-
tial and may be difficult to maintain. Id.; (4) The likely gains from opportunistic
distortion of information flow may be substantial. Id.; (5) Both the government and
operating management must bear some of the consequences of changes in cost and de-
mand conditions beyond managements' control, or shocks that other sectors of the
economy impose on the enterprise may be intolerably huge. Id.
Finally, Schmalensee suggests that under this type of management scheme, a contract
of any duration must be defined and redefined over time, thus resembling regulation in
any event. Id. at 79. This is certainly true when, for example, management is subject to
unanticipated and relatively uncontrollable cost increases due to labor negotiations. To
forestall such a problem, the enabling legislation may wish to specify certain provisions
with which contracts with labor organizations must comply. For example, in Illinois,
RTA labor contracts may not prohibit part-time operators, and two-thirds of the RTA
members must prove the cost of the contract. If approval is not given, the contract may
be reopened. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/3, 328a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
140. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 421. The fact that rival groups of shareholders
in a private corporation may at times seize capital is thought to be a powerful incentive
to management efficiency. W. SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWERS:
ANTITRUST, REGULATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 202-03 (1975).
141. See Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopoly-In General and
With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGNIT. Scl. 73, 78-79 (1976). "The future is
permitted to unfold and adaptations are introduced, at contract renewal intervals, only
to those events which actually materialize ... sequential decision-making procedure
economizes greatly on bounded rationality." Id. at 83.
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and management than engaging in management audits and other mini-
mal performance constraints.' 4 2 First, the Commission's attention will
be properly focused on ensuring that the contract management firm
meets the contract criteria. Second, once the management firm con-
tract establishes the criteria, the monitoring of management perform-
ance poses relatively limited problems of data collection and
interpretation. Management is relieved of the burden of generating a
multitude of reports for the Transit Board because adequate perform-
ance is self-imposed under a scheme that produces financial rewards
for efficient performance. Finally, the effectiveness of the contracting
process should improve over time. Each subsequent round of compre-
hensive review and contract negotiations should provide feedback to
assist in examining criteria for the next management contract.
A contract management approach also avoids the political road-
blocks that traditionally make transit management posts unattractive
to extremely able managers. As in a private firm context,'43 salaries
sufficiently high to attract top management talent and incentive com-
pensation schemes to elicit superior performance are both possible.'"
Subd. 3. [MEMBERSHIP]
(a) The Metropolitan Transit Commission consists of three mem-
bers appointed by the Council. No two members may be residents of
the same political subdivision within the regional transportation area.
Each member of the Commission must have management experience.
A member shall not be a member of the Council, the Transit Board, or
any other independent regional commission, board, or agency, or hold
judicial office during his term of office. Each member shall qualify by
taking and subscribing to the oath of office as prescribed in the state
constitution.
(b) The term of each member of the Commission shall be three
years except for the initial terms as provided. One member of the
Commission shall be initially appointed for a term length of one year,
142. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 29-30, 101-03.
143. See Lave, supra note 77, at 33, 35-36; Garner, supra note 123, at 13. W. ROB-
SON, supra note 73, at 453; N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 16, 101-02.
144. This proposal is simple and quite possible to implement given present condi-
tions in the transit industry. In fact, within the past several years it has become increas-
ingly utilized in the transit industry. As of 1979, five contract management firms
provided management services to a total of sixty-six urbanized areas to operate their
transit system. Crosby, Contract Management-The Way to Go?, MASS TRANSIT 46
(August 1976). See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 108-09, for a
description of current procedures for awarding management contracts.
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one member shall be initially appointed for a term length of two years,
and one member shall be initially appointed for a term length of three
years. Members may be reappointed for additional terms. A member
may not, however, serve more than two consecutive full terms.
(c) The Commission shall annually elect a member to serve as the
chair of the Commission for a term of one year. The chair shall preside
at all meetings of the Commission, if present, and shall perform all
other duties assigned to him by the Commission or by law. The chair
may call special meetings of the Commission.
(d) Members may be removed by the Council at will. If the office
of a member becomes vacant, the vacancy must be filled in the same
manner in which the appointment to that office was made.
(e) Members shall receive a fixed annual salary, to be established
from time to time by the Council. That salary shall be substantial
enough to attract qualified candidates and to encourage responsible
performance. In addition, members shall be reimbursed for reasonable
expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. Members may
not be the recipients of gifts, rewards, or perquisites.
Subd. 4. [COMMISSION; ANNUAL REPORTS]
(a) The Commission on or before - of each year shall pre-
pare a report for the preceding fiscal year, and as far as practicable, for
the further time up to the preparation of the report, containing in addi-
tion to such other matters as the Commission may deem proper, the
following:
(i) the activities of the Commission during the period covered by
the report;
(ii) the Commission's operating objectives and performance crite-
ria, and an explanation of how the Commission is achieving lowest cost
production;
(iii) the financial condition of public transit systems under the
control of the Commission; and
(iv) a complete financial accounting of the financial accounts and
affairs of the Commission during the fiscal years.
(b) Each report must be filed with the secretary of the Commission
and a copy must be filed with the Transit Board, the Council, and the
secretary of state. Copies must also be submitted annually to the legis-
lature and to the governor, to each member of the legislature, to each
county, and to each elected chief executive of each municipality in the
metropolitan area.
(c) The Commission shall employ a certified public accountant or
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
60 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:3
firm to make an annual audit of the Commission's financial accounts
and affairs for the last fiscal year on or before - of each year,
and copies of the report shall be filed and kept open to public inspec-
tion in the offices of the secretary of the Commission, the Transit
Board, and the secretary of state. The information in the audit shall be
contained in the annual report and distributed in accordance with
clause (a) of this subdivision.
Comment: To ensure financial accountability, the Act provides for
financial audit of the management by an independent outside auditor.
Another requisite for financial accountability is sufficient Transit
Board competence to effectively monitor the financial integrity of the
firm.
Section 6. [TORT LIABILITY]
Subd. 1. The Transit Board and the Commission shall be liable for
the acts and negligence of the directors, commissioners, servants, and
employees of the Transit Board or the Commission in the management
and operation of the Transit Board and the Commission and of the
properties owned, leased, and operated by it. The directors and com-
missioners shall not be personally liable for discretionary acts within
the scope of their authority.
Comment: Similar to private corporations, the Transit Board and
Commission may sue and be sued under section 4, subdivision 2(b) and
section 5, subdivision 2(b). The personal liability of directors and com-
missioners, however, is a separate question. Common law has long ac-
corded personal immunity for discretionary action or acts when an
official, acting within the scope of his authority, has the power to make
choices among alternatives as contrasted with a mere obedience or exe-
cution of policy without judgment. 145 Transit Board and Commission
actions in financing, planning, awarding of contracts, and management
of the transit operations are clearly discretionary and thus receive the
protection of personal immunity for such acts. 146
145. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 209, 218 (1963). The "scope of authority" concept may be somewhat manipulable
in some states, resulting in declarations that official actions are ultra vires when the
equities favor compensation. Sikora, Public Officers' Personal Liability for Money Dam-
ages, 62 MASS. L.Q. 31, 37-38 (1977).
146. Mashaw, supra note 36, at 20. The Illinois act attempts to limit liability. It
removes the Regional Transit Authority from any civil liability for injury or agency acts
or omissions that may tend to run to the Authority by virtue of having funded or hired
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The Civil Rights Act of 1871147 qualifies the immunity from civil
liability for discretionary actions within the Transit Board's or Com-
mission's scope of authority. State and local authority boards exercis-
ing discretionary authority are exposed to personal liability and money
damages pursuant to section 1983 of the Act if, under an objective test,
their actions are proved to have been taken without good faith to
abridge a right guaranteed by the federal laws or constitution. 148 To
the degree that directors and commissioners are exposed to civil liabil-
ity under section 1983, directors' insurance seems appropriate.
149
Subd. 2. The Commission shall be liable in tort to passengers and to
persons in the exercise of due care who are not passengers nor in the
employment of the Commission for personal injury, death, and damage
to property; provided that any such action for personal injury, death,
or property damage shall be commenced only within two years after
the date of such injury, death, or damage.
Section 7. [JUDICIAL REVIEW]
Any person aggrieved by any rate or service or change of service
fixed by the Transit Board or Commission may bring an appeal against
the Transit Board or Commission in the Court of Appeals for the pur-
pose of determining the validity of any such charge, service, or change
of service. The ground for such an appeal shall be restricted to an
error of law; otherwise all such actions by the Transit Board or Com-
mission are final. Upon finding the Transit Board or Commission ac-
the transportation producer. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/., 705.03 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
Historically, this immunity was granted for the policy reasons that civil liability
would induce timidity in decisionmaking on the part of public officials, see Mashaw,
supra note 36, at 26; Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), and deter
able persons from participating as directors. See Note, Personal Liability of Directors of
Federal Government Corporations, 30 CASE W. RES. 733, 765-66 (1980).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
148. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
149. Baxter points out that liability induces the employee to adopt risk-averting
behavior that is suboptimal from the standpoint of the employer. Baxter, Enterprise
Liability, Public and Private, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 45, 49 (1978). The community
as employer is not served if able candidates will not accept appointment because of
possible liability exposure. Moreover, liability insurance probably does not undermine
the deterrent effect of civil liability. Any finding of negligence still has a significant
effect on professional reputation. M. SCHAEFFTLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: IN-
DEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 81
(1976).
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tion to be an error of law, the court shall issue an order setting aside
the error and returning the matter to the Transit Board or Commission
for such further action as is consistent with the findings of the court.
No cause of action shall exist on behalf of any person directly or indi-
rectly, under which any court shall have jurisdiction or power to sus-
pend the operation of any order or rule of the Transit Board or
Commission that fixes rates, fares, tolls, rents, or other charges for the
use of services or that changes services of the transportation facilities
under the jurisdiction of the Transit Board or Commission.
Comment: The Transit Board and Commission should be subject to
the customary standards of judicial review of agency action in order to
determine whether the Transit Board or Commission has exceeded the
discretion delegated to it or to compel the Transit Board or Commis-
sion to perform its duty. 5' Judicial review will be limited, however, to
the extent that the statute expressly precludes judicial review of the
Transit Board's actions and to the extent that the action has been com-
mitted to agency discretion.15 1
The Act expressly designates that the Transit Board's actions are
final and reviewable only as to an error of law, legislatively restricting
any review of questions of fact. 52 Board and Commission actions
must be unreviewable as "committed to agency discretion" because the
types of powers and duties that they are mandated to perform, particu-
larly the financing, planning, and management decisions, are those
types of activities that require agency skill and expertise.' 53 Transit
150. See N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 125.
151. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982).
152. Courts recognize a basic presumption of reviewability of agency action unless
clear and convincing evidence exists of a legislative intent to preclude review. See Ab-
bott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Even when such intent has been
shown, as in the Model Act, finality clauses will be narrowly interpreted when vital
personal interests are at stake. W. GELLHORN, C. BYCE & P. STRAUSs, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CASES AND COMMENTS 942 (7th ed. 1979). When, however, the administrative
action in question relates to less vital matters, for example, statutorily created "benefits"
such as transit service, the finality clause will generally be given a more sympathetic, if
not literal, interpretation. Id. at 943. Thus, the Model Act makes the Transit Board's
decisions reviewable only to the extent that an error of law or statutory interpretation is
alleged.
153. The courts have been reluctant to review decisions by administrators who are
responding to complex decision-making. When statutes have committed action to
agency discretion, the courts have refrained from entering the highly specialized areas
of administration for the purpose of determining whether discretion has been abused.
For example, courts are unlikely to review an authority's rate setting except to ensure
that specified procedures at met, for the breadth of the statutory mandate makes it
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/2
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Board and Commission actions, however, should always be reviewable
to the extent necessary to ensure that an agency has not violated its
statutory authority. Otherwise, the agency concerned may perceive a
standing invitation to disregard the statutory requirements and to ex-
ceed the powers conferred. 54 Thus, Transit Board and Commission
actions are reviewable for an error of law only.155
Section 8. [TAXATION] [The Act contains no provision for tax reve-
nues earmarked for the transit system].
Comment: The question of whether or not to earmark specific tax
revenues for transit purposes is unresolved. Advocates list several ben-
efits. The first of these is the possibility of lower costs. The grant of
earmarked tax revenue to the Transit Board may increase efficiency
because of the reduction both in uncertainty with regard to system rev-
enues and in the possibility that local government will use the purse
strings to interfere with transit operations. Great uncertainty concern-
ing the amount of future transit subsidies will prevent long term plan-
ning. 56  A second more general benefit is that earmarking of tax
difficult to find judicial standards to apply. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note
8, at 125. Along these lines, one court stated:
[i]t would be most unusual for Congress to subject to judicial review discretionary
action by an agency in administering a contract which Congress authorized it to
make. Other factors tending in the direction of nonreviewability are the manage-
rial nature of the responsibilities....
Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1971).
154. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 445-46 (1984).
155. Tension and confusion have long existed between the nonreviewability of ac-
tions "committed to agency discretion" and the congressional mandate that a court
shall review and hold unlawful an agency action found to be an abuse of discretion. See
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The question be-
comes "how is it... that an action committed to agency discretion can be unreviewable
and yet courts still can review agency actions for an abuse of that discretion?" Heckler
v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 165 (1985).
Heckler squarely addresses this question and determines that the courts face three
separate classes of cases: (1) those in which review is expressly precluded, such as in
this Model Act; (2) those in which actions committed to agency discretion are unre-
viewable because "the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful stan-
dard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion," (the exercise of
discretion being "impossible to evaluate," it is committed to the agency's discretion
"absolutely"); and (3) those in which neither of the above situations apply, when actions
committed to agency discretion may be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1655.
Falling clearly into category one, the Model Act thus prohibits review of questions of
fact and managerial decisions delegated to the board's discretion, but preserves a review
for any error committed involving statutory authority or a question of law.
156. N. HAMILTON & P. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 124.
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revenues gives the individual voter greater choice in expressing his or
her attitude about government spending. Thus, tax increases
earmarked for transit purposes may receive more focused public atten-
tion than tax increases for general government activities. 157
Several disadvantages to earmarking tax revenues for transit pur-
poses exist. Earmarking impairs the unity of the governmental budget
and decreases legislative flexibility in adjusting expenditures to meet
changing conditions. 158 Recent research also indicates that dedicated
state and local subsidies relying on revenue elastic sales or income taxes
are cost inflationary.159 These dedicated funds reduce local transit au-
thorities' incentives to eliminate highly unprofitable services, to bargain
for more moderate labor settlements, and to increase productivity.1 60
In the balance, earmarking of tax revenues for the transit system does
not seem to make sense.
Section 9. [SEVERABILITY] If any clause, provision, paragraph, sub-
division, division, or section of this Act should be held illegal or invalid
by any court, the invalidity of such clause, provision, paragraph, subdi-
vision, division, or section shall not affect the remaining clauses, provi-
sions, paragraphs, subdivisions, divisions, or sections, which shall be
construed and enforced as if such illegal or invalid clause, provision,
paragraph, subdivision, division, or action had not been contained
herein.
Section 10. [REPEALS] is hereby repealed.
Section 11. [EFFECTIVE DATE] This act is effective
IV. CONCLUSION
The heart of the Model Act is the separation of planning and financ-
ing functions from the actual production of transit services, and the
creation of conditions to foster lowest cost production of transit serv-
ices. In the Model Act, local policy makers are to formulate a state-
157. Id. at 125.
158. Id. at 124.
159. Morlok & Viton, supra note 81, at 138-39. Pucher, Markstedt & Hirschman,
supra note 5, at 157, 167.
160. Few, if any states make subsidy payments contingent on meeting performance
standards. Pucher, Markstedt & Hirschman, supra note 5, at 157. In one study, transit
systems with more than one half of their state and local subsidies coming from taxes
earmarked for transit had costs that were $2.38 per hour higher (15%) than systems
without the dedicated subsidy. Id. at 169. These recent studies indicate that the nega-
tive incentives created by dedicated taxes outweigh the possible benefits.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/2
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ment of policies reflecting the appropriate social opportunity costs and
income redistribution constraints. Policymakers must ensure that
these policies are realized at lowest cost. In order to achieve this,
policymakers must translate their policies into a few unconflicting op-
erating objectives, not stipulations, framed in terms of the production
of utility. A transit system's utility arises only from the movement of
passengers. The operating objectives allow for flexibility in policy and
can be graduated to create performance criteria to measure the degree
of accomplishment of the objectives. Articulation of operating objec-
tives and criteria allows the Transit Board to utilize bidding procedures
to obtain transit producers committed to the highest production of
services at a given subsidy level.
Under the above measures the implementation of conditions to spur
realization of the policies at lowest cost is made possible. The intro-
duction of bidding for the provision of public transit under short term
contracts will both define what can be achieved with the resources
available and make its accomplishment at lowest cost more likely.
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APPENDIX A
PROPOSED MODEL TRANSIT SYSTEM
STRUCTURE
Metro Council or other Regional
Government Body
*Coordinate the planning and
development of the Metropolitan
Area as a whole.
*Plan long-range, comprehensive
transportation policy to promote
legislative determinations.
*Incorporate a Regional Transit
Board to plan, finance and cause to
be operated a public transit system.
*Review and adopt all mid-range
transportation policy plans
submitted by RTB.
Review and adopt transportation
budget submitted by RTB.
RTB Responsibilities
*Carry out Metro Council policy





*Develop detailed statement of
transit services, operating objectives
and performance criteria.
Plan, finance and cause to be
operated the public transit system.
*Contract for the production of
transit services with eligible
recipients for financial assistance.
*Prepare, adopt, implement
transportation budget submitted for
review by Metro Council.
.Acquire property and interests
necessary to accomplish purposes.
Assist and advise transit producers
in planning, promotion,
development, operation and
evaluation of programs and
projects.
MTC Responsibilities
*Operate transit or paratransit
systems directly.
*Let bids and enter into contracts
for management services.
*Acquire existing metro transit
system or lease municipal or
privately owned facilities.
-Develop clear operating objectives.
service policies and goals.
nPrepare operational transit and
service jlans for submission to
RTB.
*Prepare annual financial accounting
and activities report for submission
to Metro Council, RTB and
Secretary of State.






appointed by Governor subject to
advice and consent of Senate.
*Members mast be residents of
Metro Area.
*Each council district shall be
represented by one council member.
*Members elect their own officers.
RTB Membership
*Governed by board of directors of 6
members appointed by Metro
Council, plus a chairperson.
*Chairperson appointed by
Governor.
*Directors serve 3 year terms and
may be removed at will.
*Directors must possess familiarity
with management of complex
organizations, knowledge of
corporate business and finance, and
knowledge of transit operations.
*Directors may not hold other
offices as regional commissioners or
judicial office.
MTC Membership
*3 members appointed by the Metro
Council.
*No two members may be residents
of the same political subdivision.
*Serve 3 year terms and may be
removed at will.
*Must have management experience.
*May not be a member of the Metro
Council, RTB or other commission
or agency or hold judicial office.
-Members elect own chairperson for
a one year term.
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